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Credible Losers: A Regulatory




A remarkable fact about postcrisis attempts to end the “too-big-to-fail”
status of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) is how
much these efforts depend on the creation of new classes of “loss-
absorbing” creditors.1 If there is one thing SIFIs have never lacked, it is
an abundance of creditors that can legally absorb losses in the event of
failure.2 Regulators were unwilling to let losses fall on the trillions of
dollars of debt claims held by these creditors during the crisis.3 How,
*Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I am
grateful to Colleen Baker, Scott Dodson, Mike Klausner, Matt Levine, David Min, and par-
ticipants at the National Business Law Scholars Conference for helpful comments on earli-
er drafts of this article.
1See infra Part III. See also Total Loss Absorbing Capacity and Term Sheet, FINANCIAL STABILITY
BOARD 5 (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.fsb.org/2015/11/total-loss-absorbing-capacity-tlac-princi-
ples-and-term-sheet/.
2For example, at the end of 2015, JPMorgan Chase & Co. had over $2 trillion in liabilities,
and Citigroup had over $1.5 trillion. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report 75 (Form 10-
K) (Dec. 31, 2015), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2512090218x0xS19617-
16-902/19617/filing.pdf; Citigroup Inc., Annual Report 12 (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2015),
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/investor/quarterly/2016/ar15c_en.pdf.
3At year-end 2007, Citigroup had over $2 trillion in liabilities and JPMorgan Chase & Co.
had over $1.4 trillion. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report 66 (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2007),
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/investor/data/k08c.pdf?ieNocache5693; JPMorgan Chase &
Co., Annual Report 61 (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2007), http://files.shareholder.com/down-
loads/ONE/2512090218x0xS1193125-08-43536/19617/filing.pdf. ). Ultimately, creditors of
every major financial institution were made whole during the crisis, with the exception of
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then, is creating a new class of debt supposed to change regulators’ cal-
culus when the next SIFI falters? In this article, I seek to resolve this
apparent paradox by identifying key criteria that must be met for the
loss-bearing function of creditor claims on a SIFI to be credible—crite-
ria that had not previously been satisfied but that are arguably met by a
proposed new rule requiring certain U.S. SIFIs to issue long-term debt
(LTD) out of their parent holding companies.4 I further argue that the
existence of “credible losers” among SIFI claimants not only makes
SIFI failure less damaging when it happens, but can also make failure
less likely to occur in the first place.5
Credible losers can make SIFI failure less likely by exercising “market
discipline” on firm decision makers. If market actors do not credibly
bear the risk of loss, they will lack appropriate incentives to monitor
and punish firms for excessive risk-taking; thus, credible losers are a
prerequisite for the operation of market discipline. It is important, how-
ever, to distinguish two different benchmarks against which we can mea-
sure market discipline:6 first, expected returns to shareholders; and
second, the risk of default on credit obligations. These measures often
overlap, but not always. Shareholders may sometimes prefer riskier
strategies that carry a higher risk of default but, if successful, promise
greater gains.7 The creditor’s discipline is more likely to support the
goals of the prudential regulator, focusing on the safety and soundness
of firms, such as banks, whose failure can have destabilizing effects. This
article is concerned with discipline that supports the goals of prudential
regulation—that is, preventing default rather than maximizing expected
Washington Mutual and Lehman Brothers. See infra note 64. Without government sup-
port, most U.S. SIFIs would likely have failed. See infra note 48.
4See infra Parts II and III.
5See infra Parts I and II. “Failure” here means the SIFI cannot survive on its own (leading
either to default or rescue). To be clear, “less likely” does not necessarily mean “unlikely.”
Further, though I argue that debt offers disciplinary advantages that equity does not, see
infra Part II.B.1, it is obviously not the case that debt makes failure less likely than an
equivalent amount of equity would. The point, then, is that credible losers make it less
likely that a SIFI will reach the point of non-viability than would be the case if the SIFI
instead issued an equivalent amount of debt that could not credibly bear losses.
6See infra Part I for further clarification.
7See infra Part II.B.1.
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shareholder profits.8 I will revisit the problems with shareholder disci-
pline in Part II.B.1. Elsewhere, unless otherwise specified, I will use
“market discipline” to mean this sort of creditor discipline and “credible
losers” to refer to those whose discipline should be expected to support
prudential regulatory aims.
After explaining how market discipline can play a useful supporting
role for prudential regulators, and why establishing such discipline for
SIFIs has proven so challenging, I present my framework for establishing
credible losers. Broader frameworks for understanding how market disci-
pline operates all include, among other elements, the need for market
actors with the incentive to monitor and react to firm risk-taking.9 I hone
in on this need, which presupposes credible losers, and identify three key
criteria that must be met for it to hold in a way that supports pruden-
tial goals. Meeting these criteria is, I argue, necessary for the establish-
ment of credible losers at SIFIs.10 The first criterion, focused on
serving prudential goals, is that claimants must be more sensitive to the
downside risk of default than to the upside potential for large gains.11
Second, the claims must not themselves be “systemically important.”12
Third, and most challenging, the claims must not be “entangled” with
systemically relevant debt—that is, imposing losses on the credible losers
must not create the risk of loss or delay in the repayment of systemical-
ly important claims.13 It is worth noting that this framework runs coun-
ter to the views of some commentators on how best to discipline
financial institutions,14 but I defend it as embodying regulators’ (cor-
rect) understanding of how to promote financial stability.
8See infra notes 65–76 and accompanying discussion.
9See infra notes 92–103.
10At the same time, it is necessary, but not sufficient, for the operation of market discipline.
For example, discipline might be impeded in the absence of adequate disclosure that
allows the credible losers to perform their monitoring function effectively. See infra notes
94–98.
11See infra Part II.B.1.
12See infra Part II.B.2.
13See infra Part II.B.3.
14These views tend to rest on skepticism of the wisdom of protecting the type of debt I
call “systemically important” in this article. See generally infra Part II.A and II.B.2.
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I then use this framework to evaluate the aforementioned rule recent-
ly proposed by the Federal Reserve that will require the most promi-
nent class of SIFIs, the global systemically important bank holding
company, or GSIB,15 to issue a minimum amount of LTD.16 I argue
that the rule holds a great deal of promise for meeting the three criteria
to establish “credible losers” among the debt claimants of a GSIB—
simultaneously protecting taxpayers in case of failure and making fail-
ure less likely by promoting market discipline.
Despite the promise of the rule, gaps remain, and I propose address-
ing them in two ways. First, for SIFIs not covered by the rule, I suggest
that appropriately designed contingent convertible (CoCo) capital may
help fill the gap.17 Many European SIFIs have issued such CoCo instru-
ments, and though they have been criticized as problematic along sever-
al dimensions,18 I argue that clearer regulation and better design may
make these instruments more useful. Second, “side bets” on SIFIs—in
the form of credit default swaps (CDS) and prediction market con-
tracts—might offer another way to create credible losers where they are
lacking.
Part I provides a background discussion of the mechanisms through
which market discipline traditionally works. Part II lays out the three
criteria required to establish credible losers, and Part III evaluates the
recent rule requiring GSIBs to issue LTD in light of these criteria. Part
IV considers potential objections and gaps that will remain even if the
rule is finalized. Part V proposes CoCo instruments and SIFI “side bets”
as gap-fillers in partial response to these objections. The Conclusion
summarizes the article’s arguments.
15Eight U.S. firms are currently treated as GSIBs for regulatory purposes: JPMorgan
Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo, Bank of
New York Mellon, and State Street. See, e.g., Regulatory Capital Rules: Implementation of
Risk-Based Capital Surcharges for Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Compa-
nies, 80 Fed. Reg. 49082, 49109 (Aug. 14, 2015).
16See infra Part III.
17See infra Part V.A.
18See infra notes 179–88.
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I. MECHANISMS OF MARKET DISCIPLINE
The argument that credible losers can make SIFI failure less likely
depends on the operation of market discipline. By “market discipline,”
I mean the various ways that the efforts of firm claimants, to protect
against or compensate themselves for the risk of loss, can influence the
actions of firm decision makers. It is worth noting at the outset that the
term “market discipline” does not have a rigorous and universally
embraced definition in the literature.19 My primary goal in this part is
not to try to provide such a definition, but to describe some of the ways
in which credible losers might help to rein in firm risk-taking, thereby
reducing the likelihood of default.20 I should also note that while credi-
ble losers are a sine qua non of market discipline, they are not the only
institutional feature that is important for market discipline—others
include adequate disclosure by the firm and institutional channels for
credible losers’ actions to affect individual firm decision makers.21
19For a good overview of the literature and usages, see David Min, Understanding the Fail-
ures of Market Discipline, 92 WASH U. L. REV. 1421, 1473 (2015). See also Constantinos Ste-
phanou, Rethinking Market Discipline in Banking: Lessons from the Financial Crisis 4 (The
World Bank, Working Paper No. 5227, 2010), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bit-
stream/handle/10986/3717/WPS5227.pdf?sequence515227, 2010) (“The definition varies
in the literature but, in its broadest terms, [market discipline] is the mechanism via which
market participants monitor and discipline excessive risk-taking behavior by banks. As
some commentators have pointed out, [market discipline] has less to do with the market
per se and more [to do with] the institutional framework—information, incentives, and con-
trol—used to reduce problems of moral hazard and asymmetric information that are
endemic in banking.” (footnotes omitted)).
20That said, the use of the term here is consistent with the general thrust of the literature.
See, e.g., Stephanou, supra note 19, at 4–5.
21See, e.g., Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S.
Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing, 6 EUR. FIN. REV. 361, 362 (2002) (distin-
guishing monitoring and influencing as two components of market discipline). Stephanou
offers four “building blocks” of market discipline: information and disclosure to ensure
that market participants can effectively monitor firm activities; appropriate incentives for
market participants to monitor and react (this corresponds to the establishment of credible
losers); various disciplinary mechanisms, including quantity and price adjustments by cred-
itors, collateral and margin requirements by counterparties, supervisory actions, the mar-
ket for corporate control (rarely employed in the banking context), and legal actions; and
internal governance, such that bank decision makers are appropriately incentivized to
respond to market signals. Stephanou, supra note 19, at 5–7. Stephanou cites other com-
mentators who provide a list of preconditions for market discipline, each of whom includes
appropriate incentives by market actors. Id. at 6–7 (citing Andrew Crockett, Market
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A. Direct Market Discipline
Credible losers can help discipline SIFIs both directly and indirectly.
As explained by Constantinos Stephanou, “[d]irect [market discipline]
refers to the control or influence that market participants themselves
can exert on a bank’s risk-taking behavior. By contrast, indirect [mar-
ket discipline] is brought about by regulatory intervention triggered
by market signals.”22 Direct discipline can manifest itself in at least
three ways, all of which involve some degree of “monitoring”—that is,
paying attention to a firm’s activities and taking certain actions when
the firm’s risk levels rise or fall. First, lenders will demand a higher
rate of interest the greater their (perceived) risk of loss.23 Having to
pay higher interest rates raises the cost of funding for a firm so that
riskier firms are “punished” by lenders.24 In an undistorted market,
this should incentivize issuers to limit risk in order to lower borrow-
ing costs.
In addition to charging higher interest rates, lenders may act directly
on management to constrain risk.25 This may involve negotiating con-
tractual covenants ex ante, placing, for example, restrictions on the bor-
rower’s ability to assume new liabilities, sell certain assets, or make
Discipline and Financial Stability, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 977 (2002); David T. Llewellyn, Inside
the ‘Black Box’ of Market Discipline, 25 ECON. AFFAIRS 41 (2005); Hal S. Scott, Market Discipline
for Financial Institutions and Sovereigns, in MARKET DISCIPLINE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND INDUS-
TRIES 69 (Claudio Borio et al., 2004).
22Stephanou, supra note 19, at 5. See also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RES. SYS. & U.S. DEP’T
OF TREASURY, THE FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF MANDATORY SUBORDINATED DEBT 24–28
(2000) (discussing types of “direct” and “indirect” market discipline in the context of sub-
ordinated debt for banks).
23See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RES. SYS. & U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at 4 (“Direct
market discipline is exerted when a firm’s expected cost of issuing debt instruments increases
substantially with an increase in its risk profile. For this to occur, investors must gather informa-
tion about the firm’s risks and prospects, and then incorporate that information into their deci-
sions to buy the firm’s debt. The anticipation of substantially higher funding costs should
provide an incentive ex ante for the firm to refrain from excessive risk taking.”).
24Id.
25See infra notes 26–27 and accompanying discussion of contract and informal lobbying. Stepha-
nou also cites markets for corporate control and lawsuits as potential market disciplinary mecha-
nisms. Stephanou, supra note 19, at 10. He notes, however, that the market for corporate control
has rarely been employed as a disciplinary mechanism in the banking industry. Id. at 10 n.12.
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dividend payments to equity lenders.26 It may also involve informal lob-
bying of management.27
A final type of direct discipline “occurs when . . . a bank experiences
withdrawals of funds as its risk increases.”28 This is often referred to as
“quantity market discipline,” and may occur gradually or turn into a
run—that is, the en masse withdrawal of short-term funding.29 This is a
particularly salient issue for financial institutions that rely on large num-
bers of short-term creditors to “roll over” their debt from period to
period. The classic example is the bank deposit: depositors have the
right to withdraw their money on demand, but banks rely on the major-
ity of depositors keeping their money in the bank—or “rolling over”
26See generally William W. Bratton, Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: Economics and
Law, Theory and Practice, Substance and Process, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 39 (2006).
27Lobbying management is more commonly associated with the type of discipline exercised by
equity claimants. Although shareholders generally have no contractual rights to force a corpora-
tion’s management to take or refrain from taking any particular action—see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(a)(2016) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chap-
ter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors. . . .”)—they may exert
informal influence and use the threat of board votes to force management’s hand on important
issues. This has become increasingly prevalent under the current model of shareholder activism.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Cost of Agency Capitalism: Activist Invest-
ors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 866–67 (2013). As discussed
below, however, equity investors will sometimes want the firm to take on more risk than is socially
optimal. See infra Part II.B.1. Although extracontractual lobbying is more common by sharehold-
ers, creditors may also engage in such lobbying in attempts to affect management decisions. One
noteworthy example occurred in the landmark Delaware case Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holding Inc. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In the case, Revlon’s management agreed to waive certain
covenants on senior subordinated notes (the “Notes”) in connection with a merger, which pro-
voked an angry response from the noteholders. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178 (“When the merger, and
thus the waiver of the Notes covenants, was announced, the market value of these securities
began to fall. The Notes, which originally traded near par, around 100, dropped to 87.50 by
October 8. One director later reported (at the October 12 meeting) a ‘deluge’ of telephone calls
from irate noteholders, and on October 10 the Wall Street Journal reported threats of litigation
by these creditors.”). Id. Revlon’s management tried to strike a new merger deal involving an
exchange of the Notes to appease the noteholders, despite owing the noteholders “no further
duties under the circumstances.” Id. at 178–79, 184. Although the Delaware Supreme Court ulti-
mately held that in the context of an “auction” of the company, directors could not favor cred-
itors at the expense of shareholders, the incident illustrates the occasional influence creditor
lobbying may have on management. Id. at 185.
28Rosalind L. Bennett et al., Market Discipline by Bank Creditors During the 2008–2010 Crisis,
20 J. FIN STABILITY 51, 56 (2015).
29Id.
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their loan to the bank—from day to day. If these creditors run, the
results can be catastrophic for the issuer. The mere threat of a run may
serve a disciplinary role ex ante, as decision makers adopt a conservative
strategy to avoid piquing creditors’ anxiety.30
B. Indirect Market Discipline
The mechanisms outlined thus far involve a direct channel from credible los-
ers to firm actors. It is also possible, however, that credible losers can provide
price signals that regulators then use to inform their oversight efforts, creat-
ing an indirect sort of discipline.31 The concept is straightforward: loans that
bear a credible risk of loss will demand a higher rate of interest. Regulators
can then use this pricing information to help determine which SIFIs are at
greater risk of default and focus their supervisory efforts more intensively
on these firms.32 It is also possible that “quantity discipline”—the withdrawal
30For a further discussion of this type of discipline, see infra Part II.B.2. It is worth flag-
ging here, however, that this type of discipline could conflict with the goals of prudential
regulation. It has nevertheless been influential in the economics literature. See, e.g.,
Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal
Banking Arrangements, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 497, 497–98 (1991). Similarly, a common theme
in the law and banking literature is that depositor discipline would be effective but for the
existence of deposit insurance (which may be justified on other grounds). See, e.g., Jona-
than R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank
Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1988) (arguing that “[a]lthough deposit insurance
generally achieves its purpose of preventing bank runs, it does so at the cost of providing
incentives for excessive risk taken by banks”); Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett,
Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J.
REG. 215, 216 (1988) (finding “a good deal of support for the proposition that depositor
discipline can control risk-taking by bank[s]”). While no one questions the link between
excessive risk-taking by a bank and the possibility of runs in the absence of deposit insur-
ance, some do question how much this actually affects bank decision-makers ex ante. See,
e.g., J€urg M. Blum, Subordinated Debt, Market Discipline, and Banks’ Risk Taking, 26 J. BANK-
ING & FIN. 1427, 1438 (2002) (arguing that disciplinary acts by creditors once risks become
apparent “will not prevent inefficiently high risk choices by banks ex ante”).
31Some commentators include actions of private agents to rein in risk based on the market
signals provided by credible losers as “indirect discipline.” See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra
note 28. I follow Stephanou in using it to refer to regulatory action based on these signals.
Stephanou, supra note 19, at 5. In any event, this is an issue of semantics that makes no
analytic difference. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RES. SYS. & U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra
note 22.
32See, e.g., Gary Stern, President, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, Address at the 35th
Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago (May 6, 1999) (transcript available at https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/
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of funding from a financial institution—could occur gradually enough to
provide regulators not only with a signal of excessive risk, but sufficient time
to try to counteract that risk via supervisory means.33 Precisely how to struc-
ture the link between market signals and regulatory efforts is an important
question, but beyond the scope of this article.34
Regulators, of course, face few limits in the information they can get
directly from GSIBs.35 Because of this, they have visibility into GSIB
operations that the public does not.36 The idea that market actors could
the-region/managing-moral-hazard-with-market-signals-how-regulation-should-change-with-
banking) (“Development of a policy framework for the use of market signals requires two
steps. First, policymakers must credibly put creditors and others capable of providing
market discipline at risk of loss, so that market signals are generated. To accomplish this
successfully, the reform must address TBTF and instability. Second, bank regulators must
explicitly and systematically incorporate market signals into the supervisory process.”).
33Bennett et al., supra note 28, at 52.
34One obvious if limited step with respect to banks would be for regulators to incorporate
these signals into CAMELS scores, which are used to help determine the premium a bank
must pay for deposit insurance. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 275 (5th ed. 2013) (“The acronym CAMELS reflects six key
aspects of a bank’s condition: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings,
Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk. Examiners rate each aspect on a 1 to 5 scale, with
1 as the highest and 5 as the lowest possible score. They also assign the bank a ‘composite’
(i.e., overall) CAMELS rating, again on a 1 to 5 scale.”).
35GSIBs have regulatory examination teams on-site year-round with considerable discre-
tion to review GSIB operations, portfolios, and practices. See, e.g., THOMAS EISENBACH
ET AL., SUPERVISING LARGE, COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: WHAT DO SUPERVISORS DO? 16–
17 (2015).
36Public disclosures from GSIBs do not, for example, typically include detailed informa-
tion on specific deals or on the proprietary models the firms use to value their portfolios
and measure risk exposures. Indeed, the paucity of disclosures that could inform potential
market disciplinarians inspired one of the key innovations of the second attempt, in 2004,
by the international coordinating body for banking regulators, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, to establish an “international capital framework.” See, e.g., Basel II:
Revised International Framework, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbsca.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2016) (Basel II). Market discipline is one of the
“three pillars” of Basel II and has also been incorporated into Basel III (2011)—but its
prescription for promoting market discipline is entirely disclosure based, reflecting the
view that for markets to function properly in disciplining GSIBs, they need more and bet-
ter information. Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking
Systems, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 23, 2016) (Basel III) The United States did not fully implement the Basel II
Accord, but rules implementing the Basel III Accord have largely been completed. See
Basel Regulatory Framework, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., http://www.
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improve on the information available to regulators is rooted in notions
of market efficiency—that markets are singularly good (and far better
than regulators) at quickly integrating multiple data streams into a sin-
gle, informative number.37 Variations of this view are sometimes labeled
the “efficient markets hypothesis.”38 The most common version of the
efficient markets hypothesis is that market prices reflect all available
(public) information, so there are no sure arbitrage profits to be made
from trading.39 Some degree of market efficiency is essential to the
operation of indirect discipline—otherwise, market actors would not be
providing useful information that regulators did not already have. Two
points are worth highlighting here. First, prices do not magically adjust
federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/USImplementation.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
For a good example of the disclosures required under the “market discipline” pillar, see
GOLDMAN SACHS GRP. UK LTD., PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURES 1–7 (2016), http://www.goldmansachs.
com/disclosures/pillar-3-q1-2016.pdf.
37The idea is that a large number of people betting and risking their own money can pro-
duce a more informative assessment of the available information than bureaucratic actors
with (1) no similar process for incorporating different pieces of data and (2) imperfect
incentives toward diligence and accuracy. See, e.g., John Crawford, Predicting Failure, 7 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 171, 201–02 (2012) (describing the theory behind the information aggrega-
tion function of markets as a special instance of the Condorcet Jury Theorem).
38A 1965 paper by Paul Samuelson is often cited as the origin of the hypothesis. Paul Sam-
uelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 41
(1965); but see JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET 73 (2011) (arguing that
Samuelson’s being credited with originating the hypothesis “must be chalked up to the
now-universal convention in economics and finance that until something is said mathemat-
ically, it has not been said at all. Seventeen years before, Holbrook Working had not just
posited that randomness and perfect markets went together. He had argued that actual
securities markets approached this random ideal.”).
39Different nuances in the definition of the term “efficiency” have developed over time.
First, “[i]t is now commonplace to distinguish fundamental efficiency—that market price
represents the best current estimate of the present value of the future cash flow associated
with an asset—from informational efficiency, that is, the absence of a profitable trading
strategy based on publicly available information.” Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, in THE HARV. JOHN
M. OLIN DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 2 n.4 (2003), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_
center/papers/pdf/446.pdf (questioning, however, the analytical basis for this distinction,
since prices can only be efficient “with respect to a particular information set”). Informa-
tional efficiency can, in turn, be “weak form,” meaning future price movements cannot be
predicted from historical movements; “semi-strong form,” meaning prices reflect all pub-
licly available information; or “strong form,” meaning prices reflect all information, public
or private. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970).
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to reflect new information (for example, about an increase or decrease
in the risk of default): arbitrageurs must seek out information and trade
on it, in the processing moving the price to its “correct” level. If they
were unable to profit from small inefficiencies, arbitrageurs would have
no incentive to seek out and trade on the information in the first place.
Thus, even the most efficient markets have an “equilibrium degree of
disequilibrium.”40 The second point is related: efficiency is a relative con-
cept, and markets can be more or less efficient at incorporating new
information. For example, the markets for mortgage-backed securities
and collateralized debt obligations leading up to the financial crisis of
2007–2008 were not efficient—these instruments were traded thinly, if at
all, on secondary markets, so there was no mechanism for quickly inte-
grating new information into their prices.41 While pricing efficiency is
conceptually distinct from the central focus of this article—establishing
credible losers—it remains a key issue for the operation of market disci-
pline, as clear signals of riskiness may be necessary (if not sufficient) to
motivate regulators and firm decision makers to rein in risk.42
II. THE IMPORTANCE AND DIFFICULTY OF ESTABLISHING
CREDIBLE LOSERS
The mechanisms of market discipline described in Part I all critically
depend on the expectation that the relevant creditor will lose money if
the firm fails. If this expectation does not exist, the risk of loss will not
be priced into the instrument, and the party will have no incentive to
engage in the costly activities of monitoring and “punishing” the SIFI.
There is broad support in the literature for the view that market disci-
pline of SIFIs is imperfect.43
40Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (1980).
41See, e.g., GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 22–23 (2010).
42Because of this, I consider some ways in which we might promote the price efficiency of
credible losers’ claims in Part III.B, infra.
43See, e.g., Jo~ao A.C. Santos, Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too-Big-to-Fail” Subsidy,
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Dec. 2014 at 29 (reviewing bond data from 1985–
2009 and finding evidence that “investors accept lower credit spreads on bonds issued by
the largest banks than on bonds issued by small banks”); Viral V. Acharya et al., The End of
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Of course, just as markets likely do not place a probability of “0” on
regulatory intervention to prevent SIFI defaults, they are also unlikely
to place a probability of “1” on such events.44 The higher the probabili-
ty assigned to regulatory intervention, or a “bailout,” the weaker the
market discipline and the more important it is to try to create credible
losers. Any nontrivial positive probability of a bailout adds noise that
corrupts market signals and discipline.
A. Can We Eliminate Bailouts?
The preamble to the Dodd-Frank Act states that it is an act to
“promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees 2–3, http://pages.
stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/pdfs/End%20of%20Market%20Discipline%20-
%20Acharya%20Anginer%20Warburton%202_10_2016.pdf (showing that the price of long-
term subordinated debt is sensitive to risk for most banks but not for the biggest ones);
Andrew G. Haldane, Wincott Annual Memorial Lecture at Westminster, London (Oct. 24,
2011) (transcript available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/histori-
cpubs/speeches/2011/speech525.pdf) (dividing large international banks into “crisis” and
“no crisis” groups depending on their need for bailouts during the crisis, and showing that
credit default swap (CDS) spreads were essentially identical for the two categories leading
up to the crisis). For a dissenting view, see Javed I. Ahmed et al., Are the Borrowing Costs of
Large Financial Firms Unusual?, FIN. & ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES 1 (2015), https://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/files/2015024pap.pdf (finding that the “CDS and bond
spreads of financial firms are no more sensitive to borrower size than the spreads of non-
financial firms”). But see John Carney, Big Banks’ Debt-Cost Conundrum, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/big-banks-debt-cost-conundrum-1430242159 (criticizing
Ahmed et al. by observing that stock price volatility for nonfinancial firms decreases in size,
but increases in size for banks, so that “[w]ithout a too-big-to-fail subsidy, borrowing costs
should actually move up for banks”) (emphasis added). For evidence not just of lower debt-
funding costs—which dampens SIFI decision makers’ incentives to limit leverage—but of
the potential impact of expectations of government support on bank investment decisions,
see Gara Afonso et al., Do “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks Take on More Risk?, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.
ECON. POL’Y REV., Dec. 2014 at 41–42 (drawing on “data for more than 200 banks in 45
countries,” finding “higher levels of impaired loans after an increase in government sup-
port, as measured by Fitch Ratings support rating floors”).
44See, e.g., Min, supra note 19, at 1473 n.210 (citing empirical research that “investors
demand lower prices on securities issued by SIFIs, but that SIFIs’ funding costs are still
substantially higher than the government’s cost of funding, indicating that investors still
maintain a significant degree of uncertainty about the likelihood of recovery”). It is worth
noting that lingering spreads between GSIB and government funding costs may also be
due in part to a higher perceived liquidity risk for GSIB debt—that is, a concern not that
the GSIB will default, but that if the instrument needs to be unloaded in a hurry, it might
be more difficult to find a buyer, particularly during periods of market stress.
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accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big
to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect con-
sumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes.”45 Despite the stated purpose of the Act, several mecha-
nisms persist that regulators can use to prevent a default at a SIFI,
or to protect creditors of a SIFI that goes into resolution. A com-
plete account of these mechanisms is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle,46 but one illustrative example is emergency lending by the
Federal Reserve under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.47
During the crisis, these emergency loans arguably saved most U.S.
SIFIs from failure48 by providing cash the firms needed to meet
immediate obligations—cash they could neither borrow from other
45Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (emphasis added).
46For a fuller account of the bailout mechanisms still available to regulators, see John
Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
95, 121–23 (2015).
4712 U.S.C.S. § 343(A) (LexisNexis 2010) (authorizing the Federal Reserve to lend to non-
bank financial institutions in “unusual and exigent circumstances”). It is worth noting that
the Dodd-Frank Act placed constraints on the use of section 13(3): before it is invoked to
make emergency loans in the future, there must be a determination of borrower solvency.
Id. at § 343(B)(ii). Also, the loan must be made as part of a program with broad-based eli-
gibility. Id. at § 343(A). Neither of these limitations, however, is likely to serve as a strong
constrain on the Federal Reserve in using section 13(3) as a “bailout” tool. With respect to
the solvency requirement, permissible procedures for making the determination include
“a certification from the chief executive officer (or other authorized officer) of the borrow-
er, at the time the borrower initially borrows under the program or facility. . . that the bor-
rower is not insolvent.” Id. at § 343(B)(ii). With respect to the requirement that loans be
made only as part of a program of broad-based eligibility, it should be relatively easy to set
up such a program that is in fact targeted at a single borrower—indeed, regulators did
something just like this several times during 2008 and 2009. See Crawford, supra note 46,
at 121–22.
48See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 354
(Official Government ed. 2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT] (quoting Ben Bernanke’s state-
ment that “[O]ut of. . . 13 of the most important financial institutions in the United States,
12 were at risk of failure within a period of a week or two”). For a description of the vari-
ous lending facilities established under section 13(3) during the crisis, see DAVIS POLK &
WARDWELL LLP, FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND CON-
TRACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 18–41 (2009).
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private lenders, nor raise through the sale of assets without incur-
ring “fire sale” penalties.49
This invites the question: if market discipline is our concern, why not
eliminate these regulatory interventions? The problem with the Dodd-
Frank Act’s promise to end bailouts is that it is “cheap talk”—because
mechanisms for bailouts persist, the mere promise that bailouts will not
occur is not credible. If regulators fear that a SIFI’s default could trig-
ger a damaging crisis, they will have a strong incentive to prevent the
default. So why do we not really tie regulators’ hands?50 If the con-
straints on regulatory intervention were credible, then the loss-bearing
role of creditors would be credible as well, and the complicated scheme
described below for establishing credible losers51 would be unnecessary.
The standard economic justification for regulatory intervention in
markets is the problem of market failure. There are two potential types
of market failure in the case of SIFI default: a collective action or coor-
dination problem among its short-term creditors,52 and the creation of
negative externalities, or costs imposed on unaffiliated third parties
49A “fire sale” is the sale of an asset for a price below its “fundamental” value (i.e., the net
present value of its expected future cash flows) due to an immediate need for cash. While
the sale itself may be zero-sum—the seller loses, but the buyer gets a great deal—it can
have pernicious knock-on effects, particularly during a crisis. See, e.g., Anil Kashyap et al.,
Rethinking Capital Regulation, in MAINTAINING STABILITY IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM 431,
440–42 (2008) (describing what they term the “fire sale externality” from widespread asset
liquidations).
50See Crawford, supra note 46, at 132–35.
51See infra Part II.B.1–II.B.3.
52The collective action problem arises from the fact that in a bank run (or its shadow
banking equivalent) depositors act in a way that is individually rational but collectively
harmful. This is sometimes modeled as a “prisoner’s dilemma.” See Carnell et al., supra
note 34, at 271–72; but see MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REG-
ULATION (2015) (arguing that the problem of bank runs is more appropriately modeled by
the classic game theory scenario of the “stag hunt,” which has a good and a bad equilibri-
um, rather than the prisoner’s dilemma, which has only a bad equilibrium). Importantly, a
run is possible even on a solvent bank. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig,
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 410 (1983) (famously
modeling runs as being triggered by “some commonly observed random variable in the
economy [such as] a bad earnings report, a commonly observed run at some other bank, a
negative government forecast, or even sunspots. It need not be anything fundamental
about the bank’s condition.” (footnotes omitted)). If a bank facing a run liquidates assets at
fire sale prices (for example, selling an asset with a “true” value of $100 for $80) in order
to meet withdrawal demands, a mere liquidity crisis could evolve into a solvency crisis.
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from the SIFI’s failure.53 In short, those whose decisions could lead to
SIFI failure do not internalize the potentially enormous costs of such
failure—just as businesses that pollute the environment often do not
internalize the full cost of their activities. Removing the tools of regula-
tory intervention, therefore, may improve market discipline but at a ter-
rible economic cost. As former Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner
trenchantly observes in his memoir, “[t]aking away the fire department’s
equipment certainly ensures that the equipment won’t be used, but it isn’t
much of a strategy for reducing fire damage.”54 Elevating concerns about
market discipline above a concern for the overall health of the economy and
stability of the financial system reflects what Geithner refers to as “moral haz-
ard fundamentalism.”55 The assumption in this article is that market disci-
pline should be a tool, not an end in itself.
A potential counterargument is that I have set up a false opposition
between unbridled, “pure” market discipline and financial stability—that
credibly tying regulators’ hands would not create large externalities, as
markets would discipline SIFIs to avoid risks that may lead to default. (Or,
to take up Geithner’s metaphor, private citizens’ fire safety efforts would be
more effective at containing fire damage than the fire department’s ex post
firefighting efforts.) There are, however, compelling reasons to reject this
argument. Specifically, damaging crises were the norm during the period
of our history when regulators really did lack the tools to intervene.56
53See, e.g., Kashyap et al., supra note 49, at 441. If bank A is forced to liquidate assets in a
fire sale, “[It] imposes a cost on another bank B who holds the same assets: the mark-to-
market price of B’s assets will be pushed down, putting pressure on B’s capital position
and in turn forcing it to liquidate some of its positions. Thus selling by one bank begets
selling by others, and so on, creating a vicious circle.”Id.
54TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 430 (2015).
55Id. at 178.
56In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, prior to the creation of the Federal
Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, bank claimants (including deposi-
tors) were credible losers, but damaging financial panics were a regular occurrence. See,
e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fourteenth Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference,
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8, 2013) (transcript available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke20131108a.htm) (discussing the Panic of 1907). See also GARY
GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM COMING 29 (2012)
(“Since 1793 [financial] panics have occurred [in the United States] in the following years:
1797, 1811, 1813, 1816, 1819, 1825, 1837, 1847, 1857, 1866, 1873, 1884, 1890, and
1893.” (quoting Theodore Gilman, Federal Clearing Houses 1899)).
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Of course, even admitting the likelihood of crises in the absence of
intervention, some may question whether the long-term costs of such
crises are really higher than the long-term moral hazard costs that inter-
vention invites.57 I find this view implausible.58 It is ultimately an
empirical question, but one that does not, in my view, admit of the sort
of unambiguous answers that would be likely to move persons away
from their prior beliefs.59 In any event, this article assumes that if regu-
lators believe an instrument’s default risks starting or substantially fan-
ning a financial “wildfire,” the instrument will not be a credible loser.
B. Criteria for Creating Credible Losers in Support of Prudential Goals
This part provides a framework for thinking about how market disci-
pline could be reestablished for SIFIs without breaking them up60 and
57See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469,
471 (2010).
58One of the key events informing the view that moral hazard should be our greatest con-
cern is the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, in which deposit insurance permitted insol-
vent thrifts to continue to operate, throwing good money after bad, compounding losses
ultimately borne by the taxpayer. I am persuaded, however, by the argument that (1) the
costs of this crisis pale in comparison to widespread panics; and (2) the more appropriate
response to such a problem is to strengthen supervision, as the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 arguably did effectively. See generally Morgan Ricks,
Safety First? The Deceptive Allure of Full Reserve Banking, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming,
Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 16-35) (“The savings and loan debacle of the
1980s and early 1990s resulted in a $124 billion taxpayer bailout of the deposit insurance
system. While costly, this failure needs to be kept in perspective. First, it amounts to less
than one-third of U.S. military expenditure in 1990. This is hardly an exorbitant fiscal price
to pay for seventy-five years of run-proof financial conditions. Second, much of this fiscal
cost was avoidable, because regulation of insured banking in the 1980s was awful. Among
other things, Congress relaxed bank and thrift portfolio constraints in the early 1980s,
allowing insured institutions to dramatically increase their exposures to risky asset classes
like junk bonds and construction loans. Insured institutions then ‘gambled for resurrection,’
compounding the debacle. Third, and most important, the savings and loan debacle was not
accompanied by a severe macroeconomic disaster. The United States entered a mild and
brief recession in July 1990. It is reasonable to conclude that, by preventing a banking pan-
ic, deposit insurance forestalled a macroeconomic catastrophe.” (footnotes omitted)).
59On the implausibility of precisely measuring the costs and benefits of financial regulatory
choices, see generally John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case
Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015).
60Breaking up the largest banks has pockets of strong political support at present. See, e.g.,
David Harrison & Ryan Tracy, Fed’s Neel Kashkari: Break up the Big Banks, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/minneapolis-fed-chief-says-dodd-frank-act-didnt-go-
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without adopting a “let it burn” approach. It is worth noting that some
instruments can plausibly provide both direct and indirect market disci-
pline, while others can provide only one or the other. A penalty rate of
interest on a SIFI liability, for example, can serve a direct disciplinary
function by raising the SIFI’s cost of capital, while also providing valu-
able information to regulators, thereby facilitating indirect discipline.
Some types of short-term debt, on the other hand, may not provide
much useful information to regulators ex ante,61 but could plausibly
serve a disciplinary role if they create a run risk. This type of debt could
serve a direct, but not an indirect, disciplinary role, as I have defined
those terms.62 Finally, it is possible that credible losers with no direct
claim on a SIFI could serve an indirect, but not a direct, disciplinary
role on the firm. For example, a CDS written on a SIFI and entered
into by third parties unaffiliated with the SIFI does not directly raise
the cost of capital or create a run risk for the SIFI, but it may provide
useful information to regulators.63 In this part, I describe the criteria
that must be met to establish credible losers at a SIFI.
1. Criterion 1: Greater Sensitivity to Downside Risk than Potential
Upside Gain
The most obvious “credible loser” among claimants on a SIFI may be
the shareholder: indeed, even as virtually every creditor of a large
financial institution was protected during the crisis,64 shareholders of
these institutions suffered enormous losses, and share prices fell
far-enough-1455636718; Maryalice Parks, Bernie Sanders Vows to Break up Nation’s Largest
Banks Within His First Year, ABC NEWS (Jan. 5, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/bernie-
sanders-vows-break-nations-largest-banks-year/story?id536101481. In this article I remain
agnostic as to the wisdom of such a move but assume that SIFIs will nevertheless be a con-
tinuing feature of the financial landscape for the foreseeable future.
61This is true to the degree the debt remains “informationally insensitive”—a feature that
explains the very existence of much short-term debt. See Gorton, supra note 41. In this
context, ex ante means prior to the run occurring, at which point it will likely be too late
for regulatory action to prevent failure.
62See supra notes 20–39.
63For further discussion of CDS, see infra Part V.B.1.
64The exceptions are Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual, both of whose failures
involved haircuts for creditors. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 48, at 353–89.
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drastically.65 Equity claimants also benefit from trading in highly liquid
secondary markets, so expectations about losses are quickly and effi-
ciently incorporated into share prices.66 And although SIFIs do not rou-
tinely issue new equity—and thus are not directly punished with a
higher cost of capital—their executives’ compensation is often linked to
the share price67 so that these decision makers are highly motivated to
maximize returns on equity.
Despite the credibility of losses being imposed on shareholders, from
the perspective of the prudential regulator,68 equity is an imperfect, and
sometimes perverse, disciplinarian of SIFI decision makers. First, it may
be the case that equity claims that should be wiped out retain some val-
ue due to regulatory intervention—that zeroing out equity would, for
practical purposes, require a resolution process that regulators are hesi-
tant to invoke because of the effect it could have on systemically impor-
tant claims.69
65See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear
Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. REG. 257, 260 (2010).
66See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes.
67Id.
68The aim of prudential regulation is to prevent disorderly and destabilizing failure of
banks and other financial institutions as well as to protect depositors and the deposit insur-
ance fund. It is worth contrasting this with the mission of the typical securities market regu-
lator. Securities regulation typically does not try to prevent companies from failing or to
protect investors from losses; rather, its mode of investor protection is to ensure investors
have adequate information to understand the inherent risks of a given investment. Similar-
ly, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s oversight of broker–dealers has traditionally
been much less concerned about the risk of their failure than the traditional banking regu-
lator vis-a-vis the banks it oversees. See Crawford, supra note 46, at 113 n.86 (“Broker–
dealers’ primary regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission, has traditionally
focused on investor protection and promoting capital formation rather than on the safety
and soundness of broker dealers. (‘Safety and soundness’ regulation can for most purposes
be used synonymously with ‘prudential’ regulation.) The SEC has differed in this respect
from the regulators of commercial banks because broker-dealers did not traditionally fund
themselves with deposit-like debt, and so their failure was unlikely to have the same type
of systemic implications as a commercial bank. Even today, after the rise of shadow bank-
ing and the crisis, there is resistance to the notion that the SEC should incorporate pru-
dential concerns into its mission.”).
69See the discussion of “entanglement,” infra Part III.A.3.
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Second, even if there were no expectation of regulatory intervention,
equity provides a noisy signal regarding the risk of default. As Oliver
Hart and Luigi Zingales observe,
While equity is very liquid and its market price hard to manipulate, it does
not provide a good indicator of the probability of default. Equity is insensi-
tive on the downside (because of limited liability) and very sensitive on the
upside; thus, a small probability of a positive event can sustain significant
equity prices even in the presence of a high probability of default.70
Debt, on the other hand, “is insensitive to the upside but very
sensitive to the downside”71—thus providing a much clearer signal for
regulators and punishing firms that are perceived as more likely to
default.72
Finally, and most troublingly, to the degree equity interests do affect
firm decision making—either through formal or informal investor activ-
ism, or through incentive compensation of firm executives73—the
impact may not be to limit risk.74 The strategy that maximizes the
70Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions, 13
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 453, 478 (2011).
71Id.
72Id.; see also Stephanou, supra note 19, at 10 n.13 (“the option-like character of equity
holdings (limited liability and residual claims) implies that shareholders may not be relied
upon to exercise discipline if the increase in risk of failure is offset by increased probability
of a higher return, as in the [game of] so-called ‘gambling for resurrection’”); HAL S.
SCOTT ET AL., CAPITAL STUDY REPORT: USE OF MARKET DISCIPLINE 20 (2014) (“A guiding prem-
ise. . . is that market discipline is more effectively achieved through debt instruments, rath-
er than equity instruments. Equity holders do not provide appropriate market discipline,
and stock returns are a poor leading indicator of financial instability because of the limited
liability of shareholders and the optionality of large returns that are inherently priced into
equity.”) (emphasis added).
73The trend to align firm decision makers’ incentives more closely with those of sharehold-
ers has been a major trend in corporate governance over the past several decades. See,
e.g., Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1907, 1910 (2013) (“[S]ince the early 1980s, the U.S. system has shifted from a manager-
centric system to a shareholder-centric system. This shift has occurred primarily through
changes in managerial compensation, shareholder concentration and activism, and board
composition, outlook, and ideology”); Bebchuk et al., supra note 65 (discussing the trend
as it developed specifically at the largest financial institutions).
74See, e.g., Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-
Mortgage Financial Crisis, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Report
no. 2008-43 (2008) (arguing “market discipline as a mechanism of corporate governance
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expected return for shareholders will often not be the strategy that min-
imizes the risk of default. For example, assume a firm with an equity
cushion of $2 and borrowings of $10 must decide whether to pursue a
strategy that has a 50% chance of yielding a profit of $3 and a 50%
chance of losing $5. The bet has a negative expected value from the
perspective of the firm (0.5 3 $3 – 0.5 3 $552$1), but a positive
expected value for shareholders, whose losses are capped at $2 (0.5 3
$3 – 0.5 3 $25$0.50). Because shareholders know they can shift losses
beyond the equity cushion onto creditors (or the taxpayer!), their
“discipline” of management may lead to perverse results.75
This “risk-shifting” problem is not a major issue for most nonfi-
nancial firms for two related reasons. First, creditor discipline con-
strains this type of opportunism. It may do this directly, for
example, through covenants on loans.76 Further, because the risk of
default rises with leverage, holding all else equal,77 creditors tend to
charge higher interest rates as leverage rises. This tendency makes
high levels of borrowing less attractive for most nonfinancial firms,
leading to larger equity buffers.78 More equity relative to debt con-
stitutes the second reason risk-shifting is not a major issue for most
[by shareholders] is intrinsically biased in favor of strategies that involve greater risk-
taking”).
75See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334–37 (1976) (describing the
potentially distortive incentive effects of debt on a firm’s investment decisions, since share-
holders can shift the downside risk of losses that outstrip the equity buffer onto creditors).
For an account of how risk-shifting incentives by equity claimants may have distorted
investment decisions in the run-up to the recent crisis, see Richard Squire, Shareholder
Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151 (2010).
76See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 26.
77Assume there are two firms with $100 in identical assets each; but one firm has $90 in
liabilities, while the other has only $50 in liabilities. The first firm will default if its assets
fall in value by more than ten percent; the second firm, of course, will remain solvent
unless assets fall by more than fifty percent.
78See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Anat Admati: The Bankers’ Addiction to Borrowing, STAN.
GRADUATE SCH. BUS.: INSIGHTS BY STANFORD BUSINESS (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.gsb.stan-
ford.edu/insights/anat-admati-bankers-addiction-borrowing (“For bank holding companies
in the United States, recent proposals would still allow debt to account for up to 95% of a
bank’s assets. Even without regulation, nonfinancial corporations in the United States
have, on average, only about 30% debt relative to their assets.”).
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nonfinancial firms: a larger equity buffer makes it less likely that a
given investment strategy will involve potential losses large enough
for shareholders to be insensitive to a significant portion of such
losses. Neither of these risk-mitigating factors applies well in the
case of SIFIs, which are highly leveraged relative to nonfinancial
firms,79 and face weak creditor discipline due to bailout
expectations.80
2. Criterion 2: The Claim Must Be Nonsystemically Relevant
Among debt claims, a distinction should be drawn between what Oliver
Hart and Luigi Zingales call systemically relevant claims and nonsys-
temically relevant claims.81 Other commentators draw similar distinc-
tions using slightly different terms: Robert Merton and Richard Thakor
distinguish the claims of “customers” and “investors.”82 Assistant vice
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Joseph Sommer
speaks of “financial liabilities” as opposed to “bonded debt.”83 Morgan
Ricks draws a distinction between “money claims” and securities traded
on capital markets.84 What falls on the systemically relevant side of the
divide? First and foremost, bank deposits. Second, other types of short-
term debt that create similar run-like risks.85 Several commentators
include derivatives and insurance claims as well.86
79Id.
80See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
81Hart & Zingales, supra note 70.
82Robert C. Merton & Richard T. Thakor, Customers and Investors: A Framework for Under-
standing Financial Institutions (MIT Sloan Sch. Mgmt., Working Paper No. 21258, 2015).
83Joseph H. Sommer, Why Bail-In? And How!, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV.,
Dec. 2014 at 207–17.
84Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 75, 82
(2012).
85See Gorton, supra note 41, at 27. An example of such short-term debt is the repurchase
agreement, or repo loan. Repo loans are short term, often rolling over daily and (thus)
creating a run risk; are treated by the lenders as part of their “transaction reserve”; and
are used by borrowers to fund longer-term investments.
86See, e.g., Sommer, supra note 83; Merton & Thakor, supra note 82. This article will not
focus on insurance or derivatives but will generally agree with the commentators cited that
they are not good candidates for credible loser status.
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I will focus here on short-term debt—bank deposits and short-term
claims issued outside the commercial banking system. The latter debt is
the cornerstone of the so-called shadow banking system.87 Shadow
banks issue deposit substitutes, such as repurchase agreements,88 and use
the money raised by these instruments to fund longer-term positions—
engaging in the classic maturity transformation that had previously
been the province of actual deposit-taking banks. Because shadow bank-
ing does not enjoy the formal guarantees of deposit insurance or (auto-
matic) access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window, it proved
vulnerable to runs—this was the crux of the crisis in 2008.89
The fact that default on this type of debt can trigger contagious runs
makes it systemically relevant. This article argues that the type of disci-
pline these systemically relevant claimants might impose on an institu-
tion is, on balance, inconsistent with prudential goals, because its very
effectiveness will tend to propagate the market failures described
above.90 Indeed, each of the commentators cited above argues that
87See Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, The Shadow Banking System: Implications for Financial
Regulation, (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 382) (July 2009), http://www.new-
yorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr382.pdf (giving an account of the shadow banking
system).
88See Gorton, supra note 41.
89This was illustrated by the runs on Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and the entire
prime money market fund industry—none part of the federally insured commercial bank-
ing system, all part of the shadow banking system. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 48, at Part
IV.
90See supra Part II.A. (noting the importance of the systemically relevant debt having an
instrumental value for its holders that goes beyond any investment return); see also Ricks,
supra note 84, at 91 (arguing that “deposits serve an instrumental purpose: as a medium
of exchange, they make trade easier. We might say that deposits are a component of an
economic agent’s transaction reserve—the set of assets that the agent holds primarily to facil-
itate desired exchanges.”) (emphasis added). Because of this, the impairment of these
assets often imposes costs on their holders that exceed—often substantially—any invest-
ment losses. See id. at 83 (“[B]ecause money-claims are held for instrumental purposes, their
defaults cause consequential losses to their holders—opportunity costs, operational disrup-
tion, reputational damage, or even default. (Critically, these losses are distinct from, and
might far exceed, any investment losses that their holders may experience).”) Beyond this,
short-term debt, because it is runnable, can incite panics spreading from one institution to
another in ways LTD typically cannot—for example, as bank A fails, depositors at bank B
may fear similar problems at their own bank and start a run as well. See Diamond & Dyb-
vig, supra note 52, at 410 (listing among potential triggers of a run “a commonly observed
run at some other bank”).
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these types of claims should be protected—held “sacrosanct” per Hart
and Zingales91—whereas losses on nonsystemically important debt
should ideally not be subject to protection or bailout.
This view is not, however, universally embraced. Charles Calomiris
and Charles Kahn, for example, develop a model in which the ability of
depositors to force liquidation constrains bankers from acting against
depositors’ interests and halts destructive activities by bank managers.92
(Again, depositors will have no incentive to force liquidation if they do
not fear loss).93 Other influential works posit a similar disciplinary role
for short-term debt.94 The idea has spread from academia to policy-
making circles: in a speech at Jackson Hole in August 2009, Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke cited the disciplinary role of short-
term debt as a justification for its use.95
There are, however, at least two problems with this narrative of short-
term debt discipline. First, it maps imperfectly onto the way short-term
creditors and bank decision makers actually behave.96 Second, to the
91See Hart & Zingales, supra note 70.
92See Calomiris & Kahn, supra note 30.
93For depositors, fear of loss or delay in recovery can incentivize them to run. I include
both under the general rubric of “loss,” since what makes delay so damaging for instru-
ments such as deposits is the possibility of consequential losses. See Ricks, supra note 84, at
83.
94See, e.g., Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, Does Debt Discipline Bankers? An Academic Myth
About Bank Indebtedness 10 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stan. Univ., Working Paper
No. 132, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id52216811 (describing
accounts in which depositors and other short-term creditors “monitor the managers and
withdraw their funds if the managers don’t behave the way depositors wish” (citing, inter
alia, Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and
Financial Fragility, 109 J. POL. ECON. 287 (2001); Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, A The-
ory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence, 109 Q. J.
ECON. 1027 (1994)).
95Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s
Annual Economic Symposium: Reflections on a Year of Crisis at n.14 (Aug. 21, 2009)
(“short-term creditors can help to impose market discipline on financial institutions”).
96Paul Pfleiderer cites the most influential accounts of how short-term creditors discipline
financial institutions as one of his paradigmatic examples of a “chameleon”—a model that
is put forward as saying something important about the real world, but whose proponents
defend it against criticism, or scrutiny of its unrealistic assumptions, by claiming it is just a
“bookshelf” model. Paul Pfleiderer, Chameleons: The Misuse of Theoretical Models in Finance
and Economics (Stan. Graduate Sch. Bus., Working Paper No. 3020, 2014), https://www.
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degree it describes their behavior, policy should try to counteract it. To
be clear, the claim is not that short-term debt cannot provide discipline.
It is that such discipline depends on short-term claimants being credible
losers, which creates the risk of a run, which (in turn) is precisely the
systemic event regulators wish to prevent, particularly at SIFIs.97
The first problem is that models of short-term debt discipline seem to
assume that short-term creditors exercise some degree of monitoring to
ensure that the issuer is solvent and not taking unwise risks.98 Anat
Admati and Martin Hellwig point out a basic inconsistency, however,
between this view and a competing view of deposits and deposit-like
debt. The competing view, primarily associated with Gary Gorton, sees
“[s]hort-term borrowing by banks [as creating] ‘liquid assets’” for the
creditors (e.g., depositors): “Creating these assets is viewed as useful
because, being safe and easily converted into cash, these assets can facili-
tate transactions and provide means of payment.”99 Gorton describes
this type of debt—that is, the kind that can meet depositors’ liquidity
needs for near-term transaction purposes—as “informationally
insensitive.”100 If the debt were sensitive to information—if its value
gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/chameleons-misuse-theoretical-models-
finance-economics.
97See supra note 90.
98Deposit insurance removes the incentive for the most obvious group of short-term cred-
itors—viz., insured depositors—to monitor bank health and safety. See, e.g., Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153 (1988). However, uninsured depositors and other short-term cred-
itors must still be considered. On one hand, a number of studies indicate that uninsured
depositors do engage in some monitoring of banks. See Min, supra note 19, at 1436
(“There has been extensive research on this topic, with the vast majority of studies con-
cluding that, despite the information asymmetry problems they face, uninsured depositors
do attempt to monitor and discipline risky banks either by withdrawing their funding or
by demanding higher interest rates.”) On the other hand, investors in uninsured short-
term debt of “shadow banks” leading up to the crisis appear to have engaged in little mon-
itoring or discipline. See, e.g., id. at 1472 n.208 (citing commentators who “point out,
regardless of what we think investors should be doing,. . . that investors in safe shadow
banking liabilities such as MMFs were not paying attention to risk disclosures”).
99Admati & Hellwig, supra note 94, at 4.
100Gorton, supra note 41, at 23 (“[I]nformation-insensitive debt is debt that no one need
devote a lot of resources to investigating.”).
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fluctuated with the health or soundness of the issuer, for example—it
would lose much of its value as a sort of money substitute.101 The value
of this debt derives from its informational insensitivity, which is pre-
mised on the lack of monitoring or the perceived necessity of it.102 The
issue may not be starkly binary—that is, it is possible both models may
shed light on what is going on in particular corners of the short-term
funding markets. To the degree that Gorton’s description captures at
least part of what is going on in these markets, however, it undermines
the disciplinary efficacy of short-term debt—even if such debt is
expected to bear losses in extreme tail events.
The more serious problem with relying on short-term claimants as
disciplinarians is that there is no way to sustain their status as credible
losers while simultaneously protecting the system from runs. Worse yet,
the trigger for a run often has as much to do with general uncertainty
in the markets as it does with specific problems of a particular issuer—
creating quite a haphazard sort of discipline.103 In any event, if there is
101See generally Ricks, supra note 84 (discussing the sensitivity of debt to information and
the effect on its value).
102This is linked to the fact that these claims are held not primarily as investments, but as
a storage mechanism for cash required to meet near-term transactional needs. Id. at 94–
96. While these claims do pay interest, “it does not follow that these assets are primarily
held for reasons other than satisfying the transactions motive. As Stigum’s Money Market
observes, ‘the [money market] portfolio manager’s job is first to ensure that the funds he
invests will be available whenever his firm needs them and only second to maximize the
return he earns on those funds.’ In fact, there is really no good reason for any economic
agent to hold these instruments unless it thinks it might engage in near-term transactions.”
Id.
103A good example of this is the run on money market funds (MMFs) in the wake of Leh-
man Brothers’ collapse in September 2008. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 46, at 106–12.
MMFs are a close substitute for deposits, whose investors (1) can redeem—that is, with-
draw—on short notice (essentially on demand); and (2) expect to suffer no losses—that is,
they expect back 100 cents for every dollar they invest. The Reserve Primary Fund, a large
MMF, had invested in Lehman Brothers commercial paper and suffered losses after the
firm’s collapse that would expose its investors to losses of a few cents on the dollar. Not
only did this trigger a run on Reserve Primary, it triggered a run on all similar MMFs—
several trillion dollars’ worth of claims. It is important to note that this “discipline” was
completely unanchored to any sort of fundamental analysis by MMF investors or to any
widespread weakness among MMFs themselves. Indeed, after the run was halted by a
Treasury Department guarantee of all MMF liabilities, the government collected $1 billion
in premiums but did not have to pay out a single dime as part of the guarantee program.
Id.
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a run, this is precisely the point at which regulators will have a strong
incentive to ensure that short-term debt—particularly short-term debt
issued by a SIFI—does not default. As indicated above, the risks of
default on this type of debt are considerable: one fear is that short-term
creditors at similarly situated issuers will grow nervous and decide to
err on the side of caution by withdrawing their funding—a sort of
“contagion by simile.”104 This could lead to a vicious cycle of destabiliz-
ing runs, with a number of large potential costs to the financial system
and the real economy.105
In short, the “discipline” of short-term debt, to the degree it works, is
highly destabilizing, and is thus, on balance, inconsistent with the goals
of prudential regulation. Because of this, deposits and deposit-like debt
are not credible losers, nor should we want them to be. Regulators’ justified
aversion to giving free rein to the discipline of this sort of debt is
reflected in federal deposit insurance and the resolution process for
banks106 as well as in the new resolution process proposed under Title
II of the Dodd-Frank Act.107
3. Criterion 3: Disentanglement
The most promising candidate for a credible loser providing direct dis-
cipline of the sort that supports prudential regulatory goals, then, is
long-term debt—nonsystemically relevant debt, as discussed above in
Part II.B.2.108 Unlike short-term debt, long-term debt tends to be held
104The run on MMFs, see supra note 103 and accompanying text, provides one example
of this type of contagion. Another example is the effect of the failure of Washington Mutu-
al on Wachovia in September 2008. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 48, at 366–67.
105See supra notes 52–53, 90, and accompanying text (providing a partial description of
these costs).
106See, e.g., Carnell et al., supra note 34, at 502 (describing the steps taken during a typical
bank resolution to ensure depositors have immediate access to the full value of their
accounts).
107Under this strategy, which would likely be invoked to resolve a faltering SIFI, short-
term claims on a SIFI’s operating subsidiaries would be honored completely and without
delay, while losses would be absorbed by long-term claimants of the holding company. See
infra Part III.A.3.
108It is worth noting that Admati and Hellwig attack the idea that any debt could serve a
disciplinary function for bankers. Admati & Hellwig, supra note 94. I believe their analysis
works for short-term but not LTD. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Regulators Want Banks to Rescue
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for investment purposes rather than near-term transaction needs, and
cannot be withdrawn on short notice; thus its default does not create
the same risk of panic and severe knock-on losses. In other words, regu-
lators need not fear the consequences of default on long-term SIFI debt
per se. This basic insight, along with the fact that long-term SIFI cred-
itors were nevertheless routinely bailed out during the recent crisis, has
led some critics to attack the “bank-centric” view of crisis response,
which equates saving the banks with saving the economy. For example,
in their highly lauded109 book House of Debt, Atif Mian and Amir Sufi,
though applauding the drastic steps taken to protect systemically rele-
vant debt during the crisis, claim that “[t]o prevent runs and preserve the
payment system, there is absolutely no reason for the government to protect long-
term creditors and shareholders of the banks.”110
Though correct in principle, Mian and Sufi are arguably wrong in
fact, at least with respect to the actions the government took to save
SIFIs during the crisis. Under the institutional framework existing at
the time, and given the legal authorities that were available for regula-
tors, it was likely impossible for them to impose losses on long-term
SIFI creditors without also creating the risk of delay or impairment for
systemically relevant debt—precisely what Mian and Sufi agree should be
avoided.111
Themselves Next Time, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/
2014-11-11/regulators-want-banks-to-rescue-themselves-next-time (“[(Admati is] probably
right that bank creditors tend to be more dispersed, and have less power to discipline
management with covenants, than say banks have over industrial companies. On the other
hand her concerns seem to be aimed at ‘money-like’ debt rather than the sort of unse-
cured holding-company debt that would count for TLAC, and perhaps caution
prudence.”).
109See, e.g., Larry Summers, Larry Summers on ‘House of Debt’, FIN. TIMES (June 6, 2014),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/3ec604c0-ec96-11e3-8963-00144feabdc0.html (“Atif Mian and
Amir Sufi’s House of Debt, despite some tough competition, looks likely to be the most
important economics book of 2014; it could be the most important book to come out of
the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession.”).
110ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT
RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 126 (2014).
111Id. at 125 (describing various steps taken by regulators to protect short-term debt and
stating, “[w]e view these policies as advisable and fitting within the appropriate role of the
government and central bank in preventing crippling bank runs”).
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Nobel laureate Robert Merton has adopted something like this view
in explaining the rationale behind “too-big-to-fail” policies.112 Merton
and his coauthor Richard Thakor describe the problem giving rise to
such policies as one of “entanglement,” such that impairing one class of
SIFI claims could ipso facto impair other claims that are meant to be
protected.113 The examples Merton and Thakor provide of entangle-
ment, however, involve the same individual or entity holding both
“customer claims” (such as deposits) and investment claims (such as
shares or bonds) on the SIFI. Thus, if a depositor also owns a share of
her bank and the share is impaired, they argue, the depositor will “rush to
withdraw [her] deposits—even if these deposits are insured and hence safe—
in order to meet [her] own liquidity needs and invest the money elsewhere in
order to meet their investment goals.”114 I am skeptical of this account of
entanglement. First, if the deposits are indeed safe, as Merton and Thakor
posit in their illustration, there should be no change in the incentive to
“withdraw” them to meet near-term transactional needs.115 Second, because
there is an incentive, particularly among larger depositors, such as businesses,
to minimize the amount kept in a transaction reserve like a deposit
account,116 it is unlikely that investment losses will lead to a near-term realloca-
tion of resources away from the deposit account. In any event, Merton and
Thakor do not offer empirical support for the claim that a significant per-
centage of any particular banking giant’s depositors have devoted a large
112Merton & Thakor, supra note 82.
113Id.
114Id. at 40.
115Deposits serve as part of one’s transaction reserve; people withdraw from them as need-
ed to meet near-term obligations such as rent for an individual or payroll for a business.
As long as deposits are safe, there should be no incentive to withdraw cash early to meet
these needs. If the deposits are not safe, then it does not matter whether the bank’s bonds
and shares have suffered losses or not—depositors will want to withdraw.
116See, e.g., Ricks, supra note 84, at 95 (stating holders of deposits and other short-term
debt claims “usually think of them. . . as precisely the set of assets they are not investing”);
Id. at 91 (“Allocating resources to transaction reserves is costly: these resources are both
diverted from the firm’s operating activities (its comparative advantage) and withheld
from distributions to shareholders. On the other hand, shortfalls in transaction reserves
are expensive too: such shortages can interfere with production or even lead to default.
To determine the optimal size of its transaction reserve, the firm makes its best estimate of
foreseeable transactional needs and seeks to minimize its total expected carrying costs and
shortage costs.”).
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chunk of their investment portfolio, without adequate diversification, to the
same bank’s longer-term debt and shares.
Entanglement nevertheless remains a serious concern in establishing
credible losers at SIFIs—but for a different reason. Specifically, entangle-
ment is a problem because of the delay and uncertainty caused by a typi-
cal bankruptcy or resolution process, irrespective of any overlap among
groups of claimants. Imposing haircuts on unwilling long-term creditors
generally empowers them to place the issuer into bankruptcy proceed-
ings.117 A central pillar of bankruptcy law is the “automatic stay,” which
prohibits creditors from trying to collect outside the bankruptcy court.118
Even if a particular class of creditor eventually receives 100 cents on the
dollar, the process can be slow and uncertain. For example, one species
of systemically relevant debt issued by Lehman Brothers was commercial
paper, a type of short-term, unsecured debt: a delay in repayment of
such debt can cause consequential losses to the claimant and trigger runs
11711 U.S.C. § 303 (2016).
11811 U.S.C. § 362 (2010). It is important to note that some systemically relevant obligations
enjoy certain exemptions from the automatic stay and other provisions of the bankruptcy
code. These claims are typically termed “qualified financial contracts” (QFCs). See Charles
W. Mooney Jr., The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors for Settlement Payments and Securities Con-
tracts: When Is Safe Too Safe?, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 243, 244 n.2 (2014) (explaining that QFC
“is the term used for these financial contracts in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and in
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, which also contain safe harbors. The Bankruptcy Code
contains no such universal term.”). For definitions of specific contracts that are typically
categorized as QFCs, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(25) (2016) (forward contract); id. § 101(38A)
(master netting agreement); § 101(47) (repurchase agreement); § 101(53B) (swap agree-
ment); § 741(7) (securities contract); § 761(4) (commodity contract). A key advantage
enjoyed by QFC counterparties to a failed firm is the ability to seize and liquidate collateral
and use the proceeds to offset their claim—something the automatic stay normally prohib-
its. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17), (27) (2010); see also Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment
Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011). This does not, however,
solve the “disentanglement” problem. For example, it did not forestall contagious runs on
repo loans to Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns—including loans fully collateralized with
liquid Treasury securities. See Ricks, supra note 84, at 105 n.64 (“[F]or the secured money-
claimant, there is never any upside in default. If an over-collateralized repo creditor liqui-
dates its collateral and thereby generates proceeds in excess of the face amount of the
repo claim, it must turn those excess proceeds over to the estate. Accordingly, during the
recent crisis, some dealers saw runs even on repo instruments that were fully collateralized
by U.S. Treasury and agency securities—a development which apparently came as a shock
to regulators.”).
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on sister issuers of commercial paper.119 The first distribution to any Leh-
man creditors, including commercial paper claimants, occurred in April
2012, more than three years after Lehman Brothers filed for bankrupt-
cy.120 Creating delay and uncertainty for depositors, it is well established,
can be extremely costly to them, independent of any ultimate investment
losses,121 and it can trigger runs on similar institutions—the hallmark of
a panic. The same is true for other types of systemically relevant instru-
ments, such as commercial paper—the funding instruments, that is, of
the “shadow banking” sector.122
The bank resolution process of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC) has largely solved this problem for bank deposits: deposit
insurance addresses concerns about losses, and an extraordinary degree
of regulatory discretion and speed eliminates delay and uncertainty for
depositors, even as it puts nonsystemically relevant claimants at risk of
loss.123 The FDIC’s traditional bank resolution authority does not apply
to most SIFIs, however; indeed, it does not even apply to GSIBs best
known for their banking services, such as Citigroup or JP Morgan,
because these GSIBs are not, in fact, banks: they are financial conglom-
erates that engage through subsidiaries in both commercial banking
(subject to FDIC resolution) and shadow-banking activities such as bro-
ker–dealer repo financing.124
119Commercial paper is systemically relevant, because it typically serves as part of the lend-
er’s “transaction reserve” and because it is vulnerable to runs. See Ricks, supra note 84, at
89 (counting commercial paper among the various types of “money claims”); Sam Jones,
Why Letting Lehman Go Did Crush Financial Markets, FT ALPHAVILLE BLOG (Mar. 12, 2009),
http://ftalphaville.ft.com//2009/03/12/53515/why-letting-lehman-go-did-crush-the-financial-
markets (arguing that “[w]hat happened in the commercial paper market. . . really shows
the true scale of the Lehman disaster: an electronic run on the banks.”).
120See generally, e.g., Notice Regarding Initial Distributions Pursuant to the Modified Third
Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated
Debtors, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Bankr. S.D.N.Y. (Apr. 11, 2012), dm.e-
piq11.com/LBH/Document/GetDocument/2452717.
121See supra note 90.
122This was illustrated during 2008 by the runs on Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns,
MMFs, and other instruments of the shadow banking system. See FCIC REPORT, supra note
48, at Part IV.
123See, e.g., Carnell et al., supra note 34, at 502.
124See infra Part III.A.3.
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For long-term creditors to be credible losers and to exercise market
discipline on GSIBs and other SIFIs, then, requires the disentanglement
of systemically important from unimportant claims. The most promising
effort on this front involves the development of new rules for GSIBs
developed by the Federal Reserve.125
III. THE NEW PROPOSED LONG-TERM DEBT
REQUIREMENT FOR GSIBS
This part describes a recent effort to create credible losers among GSIB
claims, as well as to promote price discovery for such claims, so that
their price signals will be more timely and accurate. At the end of 2015,
the Federal Reserve issued a proposed rule (the “Rule”) that will require
GSIBs to issue a certain quantity of equity and LTD claims.126 Together,
these claims are called total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC), and must
be issued out of the GSIB’s parent holding company rather than out
any of its operating subsidiaries.127 In return for money invested by
TLAC claimants, the GSIB must make periodic payments to them, in
the form of dividends for shareholders and principal and interest pay-
ments for creditors. If the GSIB suffers losses, the idea is that these
claimants will absorb them: by halting payments to these claimants, the
GSIB will, it is hoped, have enough left over on a consolidated basis to
continue meeting its systemically relevant obligations without interrup-
tion or threat of default.
TLAC has two constitutive elements for U.S. GSIBs. The first
element is “Tier 1” regulatory capital issued directly by the holding
company—primarily common equity.128 The second element is
125See infra Part III.
126Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company
Requirements for Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate
Holding Companies of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Organizations; Regulatory
Capital Deduction for Investments in Certain Unsecured Debt of Systemically Important
U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 80 Fed. Reg. 74926 (proposed Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. 217, 252), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-11-30/pdf/2015-29740.
pdf [hereinafter Rule].
127See infra Figure 2.
128Tier 1 capital includes common equity, noncumulative perpetual preferred shares, and
a handful of other “rarefied” instruments. See Carnell et al., supra note 34, at 223–24.
2017 / Credible Losers 137
“external”129 LTD with various required features.130 Covered GSIBs
must maintain two related but distinct loss-absorbing buffers at the
holding company level. First, TLAC must equal the greater of (1) 18% of
the total risk-weighted assets of the bank holding company (BHC) or (2)
9.5% of the covered BHC’s total leverage exposure.131 Second, the qual-
ifying external LTD component of TLAC must equal the greater of (i)
6% of total risk-weighted assets, plus “the surcharge applicable under
the GSIB surcharge rule”; or (ii) 4.5% of total leverage exposure.132
The “GSIB surcharge rule” requires GSIBs to maintain a higher capital
buffer than other banks and BHCs, based on their size and risk.133
Using the risk-weighted asset approach, and adding in the capital sur-
charge for each U.S. GSIB, Figure 1 illustrates the estimated size of the
required LTD buffer for each covered U.S. GSIB.
129See Rule, supra note 126, at 74928 (“The term ‘external’ refers to the fact that the
requirement would apply to loss-absorbing instruments issued by the covered BHC to
third-party investors, and the instrument would be used to pass losses from the banking
organization to those investors in case of failure. This is in contrast to ‘internal’ loss-
absorbing capacity, which could be used to transfer losses among legal entities within a
banking organization (for instance, from the operating subsidiaries to the parent holding
company).”).
130Id.
131Id. at 74929. “Risk-weighted assets” and “total leverage exposure” are two measures of
a bank’s or BHC’s exposure to losses, and subsequently their need for a loss-absorbing
buffer. “Risk-weighting” adjusts the size of the required buffer based on risk, while “total
leverage exposure” is risk insensitive. (Banks must clear both a risk-insensitive “leverage
ratio” requirement and various risk-based capital requirements that measure capital
against risk-weighted assets; it is a sort of “belt and suspenders” approach.) See generally
Carnell et al., supra note 34, at 216–39; see also Rule, supra note 126, at 74931 n.45 (“A cov-
ered BHC would calculate risk-weighted assets for purposes of the external TLAC require-
ment using the same methodology it uses to calculate risk-weighted assets under the
Board’s regulatory capital rules. The Board’s regulatory capital rules require an advanced
approaches banking organization (generally, a banking organization with $250 billion or
more in total consolidated assets or $10 billion or more in total on-balance sheet foreign
exposure) that has successfully completed its parallel run to calculate each of its risk-based
capital ratios using the standardized approach and the advanced approaches, and directs
the banking organization to use the lower of each ratio as its governing ratio.”) (internal
citations omitted). The regulatory definition of “total leverage exposure”—simple in con-
cept, extraordinarily complicated in application—can be found at 12 C.F.R. §
217.10(c)(4)(ii) (2015).
132Rule, supra note 126, at 74929.
133Id. at 74928. See also 12 C.F.R. § 217.402 (2015); 12 C.F.R. § 217.403 (2015).
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To translate this into dollar amounts, Bank of America (for example)
had $1.392 trillion in total risk-weighted assets as of September 30,
2015.135 Bank of America’s anticipated GSIB surcharge is 3%; thus its
eligible external LTD must equal 9% of its risk-weighted assets.136
Under the Rule, therefore, Bank of America will be required to have
FIGURE 1. Proposed LTD Requirement1Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Requirements.134
134BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., Depiction of Proposed LTD Requirement and Fully
Phased-in Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Requirements, http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/
boardmeetings/ltd-chart-20151030.pdf. Note that the chart “does not depict (i) the
amount of external TLAC that would be required under the proposed rulemaking or (ii)
any higher amount of LTD that could be required if calibrated under the proposed exter-
nal LTD requirement’s leverage approach (4.5 percent of the firm’s total leverage
exposure).” Id.
135See Bank of Am. Corp., Quarterly Report 7 (Form 10-Q) (Sept. 30, 2015). Its total assets
were $2.153 trillion. Id. at 11.
136Id. at 62. Again, under the Rule, GSIBs must at a minimum maintain eligible external
LTD relative to risk-weighted assets of 6 percent1 the GSIB surcharge.
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issued and outstanding approximately $125 billion in eligible external
LTD.137
A. LTD and Credible Loser Criteria
In this part, I will examine how the Rule meets the criteria set out
above for establishing, in its LTD requirement, a credible loser that can
support the goals of prudential regulation.
1. Sensitivity to Downside
First, and most obviously, LTD must be issued as debt, not equity, and
therefore it is much more sensitive to the risk of default than it is to the
potential for large gains from risky bets. Furthermore, to be eligible to
meet the LTD requirement, debt must be “plain vanilla.”138 This
excludes potential features such as convertibility and embedded deriva-
tives “linked to one or more equity securities, commodities, assets or
entities.”139 While the primary purpose of this requirement is to elimi-
nate “complexity [that could] diminish the prospects for an orderly res-
olution,”140 it also ensures that that the price of the bond does not
overly reflect expectations about potential upside gain.141
2. Systemic (Ir)relevance
There are several features that help ensure that bonds satisfying the
LTD requirement are not themselves systemically relevant. First and
foremost, they must be long term: they are therefore unlikely to serve
as part of the holder’s “transaction reserve.”142 Just as important, they
are “unrunnable”: claimants cannot demand the principal back in the
137The dollar amount is 0.09 3 $1.392 trillion5 $125 billion.
138See Rule, supra note 126, at 74935.
139Id.
140Id.
141For example, if a bond is convertible into equity at the option of the bondholder, it will
incorporate expectations about the potentially large gains from risky strategies in the same
way that common shares do. As discussed infra Part V.A, appropriately designed convert-
ible instruments might still be good credible losers for prudential purposes.
142See supra note 90.
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near term. A potential problem may occur to the reader, however: what
if the debt had a long maturity when issued but is about to come due
when a crisis hits? If the GSIB is in resolution, this should not matter:
imposing losses on the LTD claimants will not create consequential
losses in the same way that loss or delay in paying off short-term debt
claims will.143 On the other hand, if the GSIB is not yet in resolution, a
large tranche of LTD coming due could be destabilizing; indeed, its
effect may be much the same as that of short-term creditors who decline
to roll over their debt.144 To address this issue, the Rule amortizes the
eligibility of GSIBs’ LTD: only half the face value of LTD instruments
that mature in less than two years but more than one year can be
counted toward the LTD requirement; and LTD with less than one year
remaining until maturity cannot be counted at all toward the require-
ment.145 This should motivate GSIBs to stagger their bond issuances in
such a way as to minimize the impact of any single tranche of long-term
bonds coming due during a period of market turmoil.
3. Disentanglement
The most challenging criterion for the creation of credible losers among
claimants on a GSIB is their disentanglement from systemically relevant
debt. As discussed, this must involve a mechanism that allows losses to
be imposed on some creditors without creating delay or uncertainty in
meeting systemically relevant obligations. There are two ways the Rule
seeks to accomplish this: first, by disentangling LTD from the failed
SIFI’s own systemically important debt, and second, by disentangling it
with systemically important debt issued by other firms. Taking the second
point first, if an LTD claimant is itself the issuer of systemically relevant
claims, then imposing losses on it could exacerbate systemic stress. The
143See supra Part II.B.2.
144The concern about banks in a crisis rolling over LTD about to come due inspired the
FDIC to establish a guarantee program for LTD issued by banks and BHCs in late 2008
and the first half of 2009, with an upper limit for each participating institution of 125 per-
cent of LTD due to mature between September 30, 2008, and June 30, 2009. See DAVIS
POLK & WARDWELL LLP, FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND
CONTRACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, 116–43 (2009). The program—part of the FDIC’s
“Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program”—was extended several times. Temporary Liquid-
ity Guarantee Program, FDIC (2013), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/TLGP/.
145See Rule, supra note 126, at 74936.
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effect should be much more muted if the claimant does not itself issue
systemically relevant claims. The Rule addresses this problem with a
provision aiming to discourage the chief types of issuers of systemically
relevant claims—banks and BHCs—from buying LTD instruments for
their own portfolios. It does this by imposing regulatory capital deduc-
tions on banks and BHCs for any LTD they hold.146 To illustrate the
effect of this provision, it is important to note that banks and BHCs
must calculate two figures in complying with capital regulations: (1)
required capital and (2) actual capital. For banks to pass regulatory mus-
ter, actual capital must exceed required capital. The effect of this provi-
sion is to force banks to take deductions from actual capital, making
compliance more difficult. Equivalently, it will force banks to raise more
capital than they would have to if they held an equivalent debt claim
not issued by a covered GSIB. Because banks have incentives to mini-
mize capital,147 this provision serves to discourage them from buying
LTD instruments, leaving such instruments to be sold to less systemical-
ly relevant claimants such as mutual funds or pension funds.148
146Id. at 74949–51.
147Capital is generally seen as an “expensive” way to fund a bank’s activities. A powerful
critique of this notion in recent years argues that capital is only expensive because of social
subsidies such as “too-big-to-fail” guarantees and the deductibility of interest (but not divi-
dend) payments. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the
Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially Expensive (Stan. Graduate
Sch. Bus., Working Paper No. 2065, 2013). The critique does not, however, undermine
the notion that capital is privately expensive.
148Some critics view this as a troubling aspect of the Rule. See, e.g., Arthur Wilmarth, The
Financial Industry’s Plan for Resolving Failed Megabanks Will Ensure Future Bailouts for Wall
Street, 50 GA. L. REV. 43, 64 (2015) (“Selling bail-in debt to pension funds and retail mutual
funds would simply shift some of the costs of resolving failed SIFIs from taxpayers to indi-
vidual savers while protecting favored Wall Street creditors.”). I believe these criticisms are
misguided. If bank debt is too risky for ordinary investors, a fortiori bank equity is too risky:
indeed, virtually any equity claim is likely to be too risky. Yet mutual funds focusing on
equity abound. The Investment Company Institute’s 2016 Factbook shows that at year-end
2015, equity-focused mutual funds held over $8 trillion in assets (approximately $6 trillion
in U.S. equities and $2 trillion in “world” equities). See, e.g., INV. CO. INST., 2016 Investment
Company Factbook, 174, tbl. 3 (2016), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2016_factbook.pdf. The issue,
then, seems to be more about disclosure than risk. If the first-loss position of LTD is fully
disclosed—as the Rule requires that it be—then investors (“ordinary” or not) will be com-
pensated for the extra risk, just as they are with equity claims. Matt Levine poses the prob-
lem more generally (“Is bank debt too risky for big insurers and asset managers to hold?
Are insurers and asset managers too important to hold bank debt? If so, that would be a
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The question then is whether losses can be imposed on LTD claim-
ants without creating uncertainty or delay for the failed SIFI’s own sys-
temically important debt. Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides
regulators with “orderly liquidation authority” to resolve GSIBs and
other SIFIs without resorting to bankruptcy.149 The FDIC has proposed
a rule that would employ this authority in a way that could achieve the
necessary disentanglement.150 The FDIC’s rule would adopt a “single
point of entry” (SPOE) approach to GSIB resolution, resolving only the
holding company, and not any of the “operating subsidiaries that com-
prise hundreds, or even thousands, of interconnected entities that span
legal and regulatory jurisdictions across international borders and share
funding and support services.”151 Figure 2 illustrates—in highly stylized
form—the structure of a U.S. GSIB.
SPOE resolution would focus only on “ABC Holding Company.”
“Banks,” “Broker/Dealer,” and “Other” would be transferred to a
“bridge” holding company, their operations continuing (if all works as
little weird. Someone has to ultimately bear this risk of bank failures. You need a sink,
somewhere, for financial-system risk. That’s an important job, and whoever does it is
going to be important. But you can’t protect them from the consequences of the job. Bear-
ing those consequences is the job.”) Matt Levine, Regulators Want Banks to Rescue Themselves
Next Time, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-
11-11/regulators-want-banks-to-rescue-themselves-next-time.The point about the impor-
tance of disclosure versus risk extends to the imposition of losses on retail investors who
buy bonds directly. In general, imposing losses on retail investors should not by itself cre-
ate systemic concerns—if it did, retail investors should be banned from equity markets. If,
however, bank bonds are marketed as the equivalent of time deposits, then imposing losses
on them could create significant problems. As of July 2016, this appears to be an impor-
tant concern with the world’s oldest bank, Monte dei Paschi of Italy. See, e.g., Giovanni
Legorano, World’s Newest Banking Crisis Revolves Around World’s Oldest Bank, WALL ST. J.
(July 14, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/worlds-newest-banking-crisis-revolves-around-
worlds-oldest-bank-1468523416 (“Italian officials are looking for loopholes in new Europe-
an rules to avoid wiping out retail investors who hold e187 billion in Italian bank bonds.
Around e30 billion of those bonds are junior, or the risker type of bonds, which would be
targeted first in case of a bailout. Monte dei Paschi has e5 billion in outstanding junior
bonds, with about half believed to be in the hands of Italian households.”).
14912 U.S.C. § 5384 (2015).
150Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry
Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76614 (proposed Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2013-12-18/pdf/2013-30057.pdf [hereinafter FDIC Proposed Rule].
151Id. at 76615.
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planned) without interruption.153 As the Federal Reserve explained
when it proposed the TLAC and LTD requirements,
Certain structural features of the U.S. GSIBs facilitate SPOE resolution. In
the United States, the top-tier parent company of a large banking organiza-
tion generally does not itself engage in material operations. Rather, it gen-
erally acts primarily as a holding company, by, for example, measuring and
managing the consolidated risks of the organization, undertaking capital
and liquidity planning, coordinating the operations of its subsidiaries, and
raising equity capital and long-term debt to fund those operations. Its assets
therefore largely consist of cash, liquid securities, and equity and debt
investments in its subsidiaries. As a result of this organizational structure, in
the context of SPOE resolution the liabilities of the parent holding company
are generally “structurally subordinated” to the liabilities of the operating
subsidiaries.154
In short, virtually all systemically relevant claims are issued out of
subsidiaries; and the holding company issues few if any systemically rel-
evant claims. Keeping the subsidiaries operating while putting the (old)
FIGURE 2. Illustrative GSIB Structure.152
152FDIC, Title II Resolution Strategy Overview, at slide 14, Aug. 2012, https://www.fdic.gov/
resauthority/sifiresolution.pdf.
153FDIC Proposed Rule, supra note 151, at 76616. The SPOE approach is not without crit-
ics. See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 149; Stephen J. Lubben, OLA After Single Point of Entry:
Has Anything Changed?, in AN UNFINISHED MISSION: MAKING WALL STREET WORK FOR US 13,
13 (Mike Konczal & Marcus Stanley eds., 2013); David A. Skeel Jr., Single Point of Entry
and the Bankruptcy Alternative, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINAN-
CIAL CRISIS 312 (Martin Neil Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014). In general, however, the
Rule has inspired cautious optimism among regulators. See, e.g., Joint Comment Letter
from John Court et al. to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, FDIC 7–10 (Feb. 18, 2014),
https://perma.cc/U3S9-64QV (reporting positive views on SPOE by, inter alia, Federal
Reserve Board Chair Janet Yellen, Federal Reserve Board Governors Jerome Powell and
Daniel Tarullo, and former FDIC Chair Sheila Bair).
154Rule, supra note 126, at 74928.
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holding company into resolution can potentially achieve disentangle-
ment by allowing losses to be imposed on holding company creditors
without creating delay or uncertainty for the systemically relevant claim-
ants of the subsidiaries. Assets that would have gone to making divi-
dend, principal, and interest payments to claimants on the holding
company will be diverted to the subsidiaries to ensure they can meet all
of their third-party obligations.
There are, however, risks to relying on the historical accident of U.S. GSIB
structure.155 How can we be sure, going forward, that GSIB holding compa-
nies will not become too entangled with their subsidiaries—for example,
through “upstream guarantees” of holding company debt by the subsidiar-
ies? Further, how can we be sure that the holding company itself will not issue
systemically relevant claims, so that putting it into resolution and imposing
losses on LTD claimants would be just as destabilizing as resolving the
subsidiaries would have been? These risks motivate a key feature of the Rule:
the “clean holding company” requirement.156
There are two aspects to ensuring the holding company is “clean” in this
respect: (1) ensuring that the holding company itself does not directly incur
systemically relevant obligations and (2) ensuring that the holding company’s
resolution does not trigger new obligations for its subsidiaries. Meeting the
first prong is straightforward: GSIB holding companies will be prohibited
from issuing external short-term debt instruments, as well as from entering
into qualified financial contracts with third parties, as obligations under such
contracts are also often systemically relevant.157
With respect to the second prong, ensuring that a SPOE resolution does
not affect the continuing operation of the subsidiaries, the holding company
will not be able to incur liabilities subject to “upstream guarantees” from a
subsidiary.158 An upstream guarantee—from subsidiary to parent—would
effectively subordinate the subsidiary and its creditors to holding company
claimants. This means the subsidiary would bear losses ahead of, or instead
155European GSIBs, by and large, do not exhibit the same structural features. See infra
note 177.
156Rule, supra note 126, at 74944.
157Id. at 74930. For a description of QFCs, see supra note 118. In addition, the value of
holding company liabilities that are pari passu or junior to eligible external TLAC and LTD
will be capped at five percent of eligible external TLAC. Id.
158Id.
2017 / Credible Losers 145
of, TLAC and LTD claimants, defeating the logic and appeal of the SPOE
strategy. In addition, the holding company will not be able to incur any liabili-
ties that are subject to rights by a “third party to offset its debt to a subsidiary
upon the covered holding company’s default[.]”159 Again, such rights would
mean the transfer of losses from the LTD claimants onto the subsidiaries,
undermining the ability of regulators to maintain systemic stability while
resolving a GSIB.
Finally, the holding company will not be able to issue downstream guar-
antees of its subsidiaries’ obligations if the terms of the guarantee pro-
vide that the holding company’s resolution triggers a default on the
liability subject to the guarantee.160 If guarantees with such terms were
permitted, the resolution of the holding company could trigger bank-
ruptcy or resolution proceedings for the subsidiary, undercutting regu-
lators’ attempt to preserve the subsidiaries while resolving the parent.
B. Price Discovery
One other aspect of the Rule distinct from establishing credible losers
may nonetheless help bolster the disciplinary role of LTD claimants. As
noted above, there is a “plain vanilla” requirement for instruments qual-
ifying as LTD.161 The principal purpose of this requirement is to ensure
transparency with respect to LTD’s loss-absorbing capacity and facilitate
the resolution process. As noted, the requirement also helps ensure that
no features of the debt make it more sensitive to potential upside gains
from risky bets than it is to the risk of default.162 An additional benefit
of this requirement is that it could promote indirect discipline by
increasing the clarity of signals about GSIB health available to regula-
tors, even aside from the question of upside gains. It can do this by pro-
moting more standardized terms for LTD instruments. Hart and
Zingales have observed that a lack of standardization in bond markets
reduces the reliability of bond prices:
[B]ond prices suffer from the problem of market segmentation and illiquidi-
ty. Bond issues differ along several dimensions: promised yield, maturity,
159Id. at 74944.
160Id.
161See supra notes 139–142 and accompanying text.
162Id.
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covenants, callability, and so on. As a result of this lack of standardization,
the market for each bond issue tends to be rather illiquid, with most bond
issues trading only occasionally. This illiquidity makes bond prices a less
reliable indicator than [CDS] prices.163
Some degree of variation among LTD instruments is likely impossible to
eliminate entirely—for example, in promised yield and maturity. The plain
vanilla requirement nevertheless eliminates some of the nastiest variations
such as features that function as embedded derivatives. This could promote
liquidity and improve price discovery, bolstering indirect discipline.
IV. OBJECTIONS
In this part, I consider several possible objections to the efficacy of the
Rule in establishing market discipline for SIFIs.
A. The Single-Point of Entry Approach Is Untested
Perhaps the chief concern about LTD’s status as a credible loser arises
from the fact that the SPOE strategy is untested. Thus, questions about
whether it will, in fact, work as planned may make regulators trigger
shy about invoking it instead of intervening in other ways to keep the
GSIB from defaulting.164 A possible concern regulators may have about
SPOE is that it does not technically guarantee that systemically important
debt will be protected—if TLAC is insufficient to absorb all the GSIB’s
consolidated losses, then regulators are formally obligated to resolve the
operating subsidiary and impose haircuts as necessary.165 While this for-
mal requirement may not in practice prevent regulators from protecting
systemically important claims in a SPOE resolution,166 the uncertainty it
creates could trigger the very run-like dynamics SPOE is meant to
avoid.
163Hart & Zingales, supra note 70, at 478.
164See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
165FDIC Proposed Rule, supra note 151, at 76615.
166Many critics believe that regulators could affect a “backdoor bailout” in such a situation.
See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 46, at 122–23.
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One obvious solution to this would be to provide ex ante insurance for
all systemically important claims, as the FDIC does for deposits, but this
is likely to be a political nonstarter.167
Another possible measure that would ease uncertainty about the
impact of a resolution without creating an ex ante commitment by the
government to bail out all subsidiary claims would take a page from tra-
ditional bank resolution: the FDIC can extend guarantees to uninsured
claimants on a traditional bank if it determines that failing to do so
would create systemic risk.168 This “systemic risk” safety valve might
usefully be extended to nonbank GSIB subsidiaries in the context of a
Title II resolution.
In any event, markets—as noted earlier—likely assign a probability of
neither 1 nor 0 to government bailouts of a GSIB as it stands. It could
be argued, therefore, that TLAC and LTD are not about moving the
perceived probability of a bailout from 1 to 0, but rather from, say, 0.9
to 0.1—a huge step forward, even if it falls short of perfection.
B. Only U.S. GSIBs Must Issue LTD to Third Parties
Another potential limitation of the Rule is the circumscribed set of
SIFIs—U.S. GSIBs—with respect to which the Rule will help establish
credible losers. Other types of SIFIs may lack credible losers, but the
Rule offers little or no help for them. For example, foreign GSIBs—
such as Deutschebank, Barclays, and UBS—are required to set up
“intermediate holding companies” (IHCs) for their U.S. operations,
and under the Rule, these IHCs must maintain levels of TLAC and
LTD similar to those of the BHCs of the U.S. GSIBs.169 The IHC’s
LTD does not, however, have to be issued to “external” third parties;
rather, it will be issued “internally” to its own foreign parent.170
167Of course, it would be unwise to extend such insurance without extensive safeguards to
constrain moral hazard and protect taxpayers from incurring liabilities for losses. See Ricks,
supra note 84 (arguing in favor of limiting not only the issuance of deposits, but of func-
tional substitutes for deposits, to banks, with insurance applied to all such claims, but also
significant risk constraints and oversight).
16812 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2011). Regulators can already invoke this exception to avoid
the least cost requirement for resolving banks.
169See generally Rule, supra note 126.
170See, e.g., id. at 74929.
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While this will certainly promote stability and perhaps improve the
incentive to limit risk on the part of the foreign bank parent, it will
not provide regulators with a market-based price for the default risk
of the foreign GSIB’s U.S. operating subsidiaries.
Furthermore, the Rule does not apply at all to financial behemoths
that are not organized as BHCs, even when these firms are engaged
extensively in shadow banking activities. For example, MetLife, the
giant insurer, finances itself extensively through short-term loans by
money market funds, such that its bankruptcy could be extraordinari-
ly disruptive to the financial system.171 Yet it is not clear that
“credible losers” exist at the largest nonbank financial institutions.
V. OTHER CREDIBLE LOSERS
This part proposes potential policy responses to the lack of credible losers at
SIFIs not addressed by the Rule—that is, all SIFIs that are not U.S. GSIBs.
A. Contingent Convertible Bonds
If other SIFIs lack credible losers, one might ask why not simply impose the
same LTD requirement onto them as the rule imposes on GSIBs. It is impor-
tant to recall that one of the virtues of the Rule is that it builds off a quirk in
the organizational structure of U.S. GSIBs.172 Creating such a structure
where it does not already exist in order to establish a credible loser may not
pass a cost-benefit test,173 particularly if there is the possibility of meeting all
three criteria to establish credible losers without mandating such an
171See, e.g., Brief of Professors of Law and Finance as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant
at 20–21, MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council (D.D.C., May 22, 2015)
(No. CV 15-0045 (RMC)).
172See supra Part III.A.3.
173Of course, there are reasons to be skeptical of any sort of quantified cost benefit analysis.
See, e.g., Coates, supra note 59 (“Detailed case studies of six rules—(1) disclosure rules
under Sarbanes-Oxley section 404; (2) the SEC’s mutual fund governance reforms; (3)
Basel III’s heightened capital requirements for banks; (4) the Volcker Rule; (5) the SEC’s
cross-border swap proposals; and (6) the FSA’s mortgage reforms—finds that precise, reli-
able, quantified CBA remains unfeasible. Quantified CBA of such rules can be no more
than “guesstimated,” as it entails (a) causal inferences that are unreliable under standard
regulatory conditions; (b) using problematic data; and/or (c) the same contestable,
assumption-sensitive macroeconomic and/or political modeling used to make monetary
policy, which even CBA advocates would exempt from CBA law.”).
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organizational overhaul. One possible way to accomplish this is to create
claims that pay a fixed amount, like debt, but that can absorb losses without it
constituting default by the issuer. Such CoCo instruments would thus avoid
entanglement with systemically important claims entailed by bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. A number of writers have proposed the creation of such CoCo
claims in the United States,174 and European GSIBs—which tend not to have
the SPOE-friendly structure of U.S. GSIBs175—have issued approximately
$100 billion of CoCo debt since 2012.176
CoCos may vary along a number of dimensions, but the key ones are
the conversion trigger and the manner of loss absorption.177 Triggers in
174Mark Flannery is generally acknowledged as the first to propose CoCos in 2002 (in a
paper ultimately published several years later). See generally Mark J. Flannery, No Pain, No
Gain: Effecting Market Discipline via Reverse Convertible Debentures, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY
BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005). There has
been an impressive quantity and variety of CoCo proposals since, particularly postcrisis.
Charles Calomiris and Richard Herring provide a comprehensive summary of these pro-
posals as an appendix to their own CoCo proposal paper. Charles W. Calomiris & Richard
J. Herring, How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-
Big-to-Fail Problem, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 2013, at 21, 39.
175European GSIBs have not traditionally been structured with a holding company at the top
and an array of subsidiaries beneath—the parent company of the European GSIB is typically
deeply engaged in client-facing operations. For a proposal to change this, see Wolf-Georg
Ringe & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Bank Resolution in Europe: The Unfinished Agenda of Structural
Reform, VOXEU.ORG (Jan. 28, 2015), http://voxeu.org/article/restructure-eu-banks-facilitate-
resolution. It should be noted, however, that there has been some recent movement in the
direction of the U.S. model among European GSIBs. See, e.g., Wolf-Georg Ringe, Bail-in
Between Liquidity and Solvency 13–14 (Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.
33/2016, 2016) (“There is a rich debate ongoing on how (and if) to require European banks
to adopt a holding company structure to facilitate SPOE. Several European regulators have
begun to set incentives accordingly. For example, Swiss rules on banks’ capital requirements
lower those requirements for banks that adjust their organizational structure to make the
bank more easily resolvable. This move has prompted the two Swiss SIFIs (UBS and Credit
Suisse) to change their structure in a way similar to the U.S. holding company structure.
Once the new structure is in place, Credit Suisse plans to issue ample bail-in-able debt from
its group holding company, in order to facilitate the SPOE approach. Following new regula-
tion in the UK, British banks are also beginning to issue debt at the holding company level.
And more recently, Italian SIFI Unicredit has announced plans to reorganize its operations in
a holding structure more amenable to resolution.” (internal citations omitted)).
176See, e.g., Christopher Whittall & Juliet Samuel, Buyer Beware: The Vulnerability of One
Complex Debt Investment, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/buyer-
beware-the-vulnerability-of-one-complex-debt-investment-1455964204.
177See Stefan Avdjiev et al., CoCos: A Primer, BIS QUARTERLY REV., Sept. 2013, at 43, http://
www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1309f.pdf.
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CoCo proposals come in at least one of three flavors: (1) a regulatory
capital measure, (2) a market-based measure such as stock price, and (3)
a regulatory determination that the issuer is nonviable.178 Each of these
has potential drawbacks.179 Loss absorption may involve a suspension
of coupon payments, a principal write-down, or a conversion to equity.180
One way of understanding the LTD requirement is that it is, in
essence, a conversion-to-equity CoCo triggered by a regulatory determi-
nation that the issuer is nonviable and married to a resolution process—
though this is an analytic rather than a terminological point.181 In line
with this, it is easy to see how appropriate design choices could make
178Id.
179The potential problem with a discretionary preinsolvency trigger is that uncertainty
about timing can create valuation uncertainty. Id. at 50. The potential problem with tying
to trigger to an accounting measure, such as regulatory capital, is that such a measure can
be manipulated and often lags real-time problems. See, e.g., Calomiris & Herring, supra
note 176, at 23 (“The measure of shareholders’ equity employed by Basel is an accounting
measure that inevitably lags its true economic value, thus avoiding timely recognition of
loss.”); see also Darrell Duffie, Contractual Methods for Out-of-Court Restructuring of Systemically
Important Financial Institutions 4 (Stan.Graduate Sch.Bus., Working Paper, Dec. 9, 2009),
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/06EndingGovernmentBailoutsAsWe-
KnowThemDuffie.pdf (“Citibank, a SIFI that did receive a significant government bailout
during the recent financial crisis, had a Tier-1 capital ratio that never fell below 7% during
the course of the financial crisis, and was measured at 11.8% at roughly its weakest
moment in December 2008, when the stock-market capitalization of Citibank’s holding
company fell to around $20 billion dollars, or about 1% of its total accounting assets.
Because of the limited-liability treatment of equity and because of significant prevailing
uncertainty over the true valuation of Citibank’s assets, this stock-market valuation suggests
that Citibank’s assets probably had a market value well below its debt principal in late
2008. Nevertheless, any reasonable Tier-1-capital-based tripwire for distress-contingent
convertible debt would probably not have been tripped.”). As for market-based measures,
debt claims are an unlikely candidate, since it is the lack of other credible losers among
debt claimants in a SIFI’s capital structure that motivates CoCo proposals in the first place.
The obvious candidate, then, is the share price, which would quite possibly be a better
option than any accounting measure. See, e.g., Calomiris & Herring, supra note 176, at 29
(“Equity values, if used properly, would provide the best source of information for design-
ing a trigger. Indeed, some of the best-known cases of large-firm failures that surprised
rating agencies and regulators were signaled well in advance by severe and persistent declines
in the aggregate market values of their equity.”) On the other hand, we have already seen that
share price can be an untrustworthy signal for the likelihood of default, because the possi-
bility of large upside gains could offset a relatively high likelihood of default. See supra Part
II.B.1.
180See Avdjiev et al., supra note 179.
181Most commentators would likely resist calling LTD claims CoCos.
2017 / Credible Losers 151
“traditional” CoCos a credible loser for prudential purposes. CoCos
would be long term and unrunnable and, therefore, not systemically
important. Loss absorption by principal write-down would make them
more sensitive to downside risks than potential upside gains; and if the
trigger for CoCo losses did not simultaneously trigger SIFI default,
then losses could be imposed without creating the risk of delay or loss
on systemically important claims.
The literature on CoCo design, though young, is rich, and it is
beyond the scope of what I hope to accomplish in this article to weigh
in on the optimal design of such instruments. Two important and relat-
ed differences may, however, be worth highlighting between the pro-
posed LTD requirement and virtually all proposed traditional CoCos.
First, LTD only absorbs losses if a SPOE resolution is triggered.
Because the resolution process is untested and may carry implemen-
tation risks, this would seem to be a disadvantage of the LTD pro-
posal.182 On the other hand, if LTD absorbs losses, it is likely to
occur only after equity has been zeroed out.183 Mileage may vary on
this point, but this strikes me as a desirable feature, in that it pre-
vents (further) distortion of shareholder incentives with respect to
risk-taking.184
Of course, we do not need to rely only on theoretical proposals in
assessing CoCos; as noted, European GSIBs have issued a large number
182See supra Part IV.A.
183See, e.g., FDIC Proposed Rule, supra note 151, at 76619–20.
184The idea here is that by insulating shareholders further from the risk of being zeroed
out, it makes them even more eager to pursue projects with a high upside by a greater
risk of loss. Despite this point, a very interesting strand of the CoCo literature proposes
solving the distorted shareholder incentive problem by ensuring that CoCo claimants are
not credible losers—instead, CoCo conversion to equity would lead to massive dilution of
pre-existing shareholders, essentially ensuring that there is a loss “cliff” for shareholders
well in advance of insolvency, and incentivizing the firm to issue new equity at more favor-
able terms prior to such a conversion. See, e.g., Calomiris & Herring, supra note 176.
Again, a critique of this proposal is beyond the scope of this article, but it is enough to
note that if it is successful, it will work largely by counteracting, at least in part, equity’s
shortcoming as a candidate for credible loser status in support of prudential goals. The loss
cliff will heighten shareholders’ sensitivity to the risk of loss. In terms of disciplinary sig-
nals and mechanisms, it would involve a trade-off: a weaker pricing signal (as CoCos
would be protected from losses in this scheme, and shareholders would ultimately retain
the potential for upside gain) in exchange for stronger shareholder incentives to support
new equity issuances prior the point of conversion.
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of them.185 In the first few months of 2016, the European CoCo market
experienced significant turmoil and volatility.186 The episode was not an
unmitigated triumph for CoCos’ role as a disciplinarian: many saw the
dip in prices not as a pure signal of increased bank risk, but rather as
the result of CoCo holders waking up to certain complicated features of
the instruments.187 This was exacerbated by profound uncertainty in
the changing regulatory landscape for CoCos.188 In light of this experi-
ence, the advantages of LTD rule’s plain vanilla requirement come into
focus. If it is finalized, the uniform nature and clarity of the rule will
also help LTD promote market discipline.189 If CoCos do become a per-
manent feature of the European GSIB landscape or the capital structure
of nonbank SIFIs, the same sort of care in crafting clear, comprehensive
requirements would be called for to ensure the CoCos serve their pur-
pose both in absorbing losses and in promoting market discipline.
B. “Side Bets”
Certain “side bets” on a SIFI, such as CDS and prediction market con-
tracts, could also potentially satisfy the criteria for credible loser status.
185See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
186See, e.g., Richard Barley, The Real Crisis Is for Bank Bonds, Not Banks, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-real-crisis-is-for-bank-bonds-not-banks-
1455703543.
187See id. (“The big risk that investors have woken up to isn’t that these bonds can be
bailed-in if a bank hits trouble—it is that interest payments on them can be skipped under
certain circumstances. In turn, falling prices have raised concerns that banks won’t exer-
cise their option to redeem them at the first opportunity, requiring a further repricing
downwards.”).
188See, e.g., Whittall & Samuel, supra note 178 (quoting a professional money manager’s
statement that “[i]t’s even tough for us professionals to really keep on top of everything
that is changing in the details of the regulation”); Thomas Hale, The Tale of the Swiss Coco,
FT ALPHAVILLE (Feb. 26, 2016), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/02/26/2154308/the-tale-of-the-
swiss-coco/ (providing an account of the pricing roller coaster experienced by one of Cred-
it Suisse’s CoCos, and concluding that the CoCo’s “ups and downs. . . are embedded in a
vast regulatory saga. . . . To buy any of the almost e100bn of outstanding European AT1
debt is to buy all kinds of options on potential regulatory decisions. You are trading autho-
rial psychology. You are trading instruments which may, for whatever political or techno-
cratic reason, go out of fashion.”).
189See supra Part III.B.
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These side bets would involve contracts between parties that have no
necessary affiliation with the firm, at least one of whom nevertheless
stands to lose money if the firm falters. The bets can be structured in a
way that makes them nonsystemically relevant, and sensitive only to the
downside risk of failure. Furthermore, because imposing losses on such
bettors should not trigger any sort of resolution or bankruptcy process
for the firm itself, they are easily disentangled from the firm’s systemi-
cally relevant claims. By satisfying these three criteria, the bets can cre-
ate credible losers, and the pricing of the bets can then provide signals
to regulators. At the very least then, such side bets can help promote
indirect discipline.190 Of the two types of side bets considered here, one
(the CDS) is currently widely in use, and the other (the prediction mar-
ket) would likely require legislative action to establish.191
1. Credit Default Swaps
The first type of side bet is the CDS. Figure 3 illustrates the structure of
a typical CDS. One party—the protection buyer—pays a periodic premi-
um to another party—the protection seller—who in turn promises to
make payments covering losses on a notional sum of a reference securi-
ty, such as a GSIB bond.
The protection buyer may be hedging some exposure to the GSIB,
or to a correlated asset, in which case the CDS serves a quasi-insurance
190There have also been several proposals to create a direct link between side bets and firm
decision makers—essentially turning what was a purely indirect disciplinary tool into a
direct one. For example, Patrick Bolton and his coauthors propose “tying a CEO’s com-
pensation in part to the financial firm’s credit default swap (CDS) spread. A high and
increasing CDS spread would result in lower compensation, and vice-versa. The CDS
spread provides an innovation previously unavailable as a policy instrument: a market esti-
mate of the default risk of the firm.” Patrick Bolton et al., Executive Compensation and Risk
Taking 32, (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 456) (revised Nov. 2011), http://www.
newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr456.pdf. Bolton and his coauthors prefer CDS to
debt. Id. at 32 (“Individual debt issues vary by maturity, seniority, and specific covenants,
while the CDS spread does not. . . . As credit default swaps become even more standardized
and liquid by being moved onto exchanges, their benefits may be magnified.” (Internal
citations omitted)). The CDS prices could, thus, provide a direct incentive to financial firm
executives to rein in risk.
191See infra note 198.
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function.192 The CDS can also, however, serve a speculative purpose:
the protection buyer may have no “insurable interest,” or exposure that
the CDS helps to hedge, at all.193 Instead, the CDS may be an efficient
way for the protection buyer to bet that the issuer will default and for
the protection seller to bet the issuer will not default. This is much the
same as two parties with no connection to a sporting event betting on its
outcome.194
FIGURE 3. CDS Structure.
192A CDS may help hedge exposure to the GSIB even if the protection buyer does not
own the bond. See, e.g., Is Wall Street Over?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB123835920915467021 (providing a transcript of an interview with Goldman
Sachs executive Gary Cohn, in which he responds to a proposal that one should not be
allowed to buy a CDS if one does not own the underlying bond by observing, “If you have
the bond and you don’t like the credit, it’s really easy: sell the bond. The CDS market real-
ly is needed for people that don’t have the bond but have the credit exposure. So if you’re
a trade creditor, and you’ve got big obligations to a company and you want to make sure
you’re going to get paid, that’s when you need the CDS market, you need to hedge
yourself.”).
193See, e.g., Stacy-Marie Ishmael, Repeat After Me: CDS Are Not Insurance, FT ALPHAVILLE
(Mar. 9, 2010), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2010/03/09/169811/repeat-after-me-cds-are-not-
insurance/.
194This speculative function of CDS lies at the heart of Michael Lewis’s celebrated account
of the crisis in the book The Big Short. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE
THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010). People who were convinced in the early 2000s that hous-
ing was overpriced were constrained in their ability to “short” the market—that is, bet that
it would fall in value If one believes a stock is overpriced and wants to bet that it will fall,
one can short it by borrowing the stock, selling it on the market, waiting for the share
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The higher the market estimate of default likelihood rises, the more
the protection seller should demand in premiums from the protection
buyer, and the more the protection buyer should be willing to pay.
Thus, just as the prices of bonds themselves reflect default risk, so the
prices of CDS reflect this risk. There is, however, at least one significant
drawback to CDS from a disciplinary perspective. The drawback is that
as they currently exist,195 CDS are parasitic on bonds in the provision of
information: if the reference bonds are not credible losers, then CDS
protection sellers cannot be credible losers. Thus, CDS prices should
not be expected to provide timely and accurate information about the
downside risk of the issuer. Of course, CDS are private contracts; there
is no legal obstacle to including bail-out activities as a trigger. The fact
that a market for such CDS does not appear to have developed yet,
however, may indicate a lack of sufficient demand among private actors.
This is an area where government intervention, as described in the next
section, may play a useful role.
price to fall, buying back another share, and returning it to the lender. For a good account
of the mechanics of securities lending, see Frank M. Keane, Securities Loans Collateralized by
Cash: Reinvestment Risk, Run Risk, and Incentive Issues, 19 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 1
(2013), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/ci19-3.pdf.
One could not, however, do this with housing, or with mortgages, or even with mortgage-
backed securities (MBS), which did not have active secondary markets. The traders Lewis
writes about figured out how to short MBS without having to borrow them: using CDS as
a way to make a side-bet on them. See Lewis, supra.
195Under current definitions used by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association,
Inc., there are seven categories of “credit event” that can trigger a CDS payout: bankrupt-
cy, obligation acceleration, obligation default, failure to pay, repudiation/moratorium,
restructuring, and governmental intervention. See, e.g., Credit Derivatives—Overview,
LexisPSL Banking & Finance, https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/bankingandfinance/
document/391289/5DB7-7F11-F185-X2M4-00000-00/Credit%20derivatives%E2%80%94o-
verview. However, “government intervention”—newly added in 2014—is limited to
non-U.S. financial institutions, and refers not to “bail-out,” but rather to “bail-in,” where-
in government action results in the impairment of privately-held debt. See, e.g., Fabien
Carruzzo, New ISDA 2014 Credit Derivatives Definitions, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVER-
NANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 24, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/08/24/new-isda-
2014-credit-derivatives-definitions/.
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2. Prediction Markets
A final potential credible loser is a bettor in a prediction market. The
mechanics of a prediction market are beyond the scope of this article,196
but the basic concept is that the market allows participants to bet on the
outcome to future events, and the price of various “contracts” provides
information about the perceived likelihood of the event.197 The disad-
vantage of a prediction market is that none exists that would allow bet-
ting on GSIBs and other SIFIs, and establishing one would likely
require legislative action.198 The potential advantages, however, are con-
siderable: such markets could be tailored to meet the informational
needs of regulators, and could be subsidized to ensure robust trading
and price signals.
With respect to information, a prediction market—in contrast to the
CDS market as currently configured—could provide signals about
downside risk to regulators even if no credible loser existed among the
actual debt claims on the firm. For example, a prediction market con-
tract could be written so that the payout would be triggered either by a
“default” event (as with CDS) or by a “rescue event” (which CDS fail to
capture).199 Thus, the “protection buyer” in the prediction market con-
tract would win if the reference firm defaulted or if it were bailed out.
Defining what counts as a bailout or “rescue event” with enough
breadth to cover the various ways regulators could intervene to save a
systemically important firm or its creditors, but also with enough specif-
icity to make it easily justiciable in the event of a dispute, would be a dif-
ficult but likely not an insurmountable challenge.200 The resulting
196For a fuller account, along with various objections to prediction markets and responses,
see generally John Crawford, Predicting Failure, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 171 (2012).
197For example, if a “contract” on a Steelers–Ravens football game pays $1 if the Steelers
win and nothing if they lose, and currently trades at $0.60, this can be interpreted as the
market’s judgment that the Steelers have a sixty percent chance of winning. Id. at 175.
198See generally, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Statement on Prediction Markets, AEI-BROOKINGS
JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES (May 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id5984584.
199Id.
200See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson et al., Predicting Crime, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 51–52, 51 n.93
(2010) (arguing that prediction markets often operate with significant ambiguity, but
“market makers do not have to frequently unwind trades or settle disputes”).
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information could provide regulators a picture of the financial health of
the IHCs of foreign GSIBs as well as of nonbank SIFIs. It could also
serve as a useful benchmark for judging the effectiveness of the regula-
tory design of LTD in creating a credible loser.
Prediction markets are a further potential advantage; because they
also offer a way to overcome liquidity issues in a manner other markets
do not. While most markets produce information as a byproduct of
speculation, risk-hedging, or bets placed for entertainment value (as
with much sports betting), prediction markets “turn this side effect [of
information aggregation] into the main effect: if you want to know
more on a topic, create and subsidize betting markets on that topic to
elicit more accurate estimates.”201 Subsidies would help ensure liquid
trading and better price discovery. The various ways in which subsidies
could be provided is beyond the scope of this article, but a typical pro-
posal is for some regulatory body to be given a budget to accept bids
and offers on contracts in the prediction market at random—essentially
providing “dumb money” to market makers.202
A final potential advantage of prediction markets it that they could
provide more granular information about where risks lie within GSIBs
and other SIFIs. For example, contracts could be written that would
pay out if losses within a given unit of a firm exceeded some threshold
magnitude over a defined number of quarters during the contract
life.203 Of course, this would only work to the degree that appropriate
disclosures were required of the firm to provide a basis for distinguish-
ing the performance of the different units.204
CONCLUSION
Achieving effective prudential regulation without stymieing the dynamic
benefits of the financial system can be difficult; regulators should ideally
201Robin Hanson, The Policy Analysis Market: A Thwarted Experiment in the Use of Prediction
Markets for Public Policy, INNOVATIONS: TECHNOLOGY, GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION, Summer
2007, at 73.
202See Crawford, supra note 198.
203See id. at 210.
204This could conceivably become part of the “Pillar 3” disclosures that the largest BHCs
now make. See supra note 36.
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be able to avail themselves of a wide array of tools and information
sources. Markets can provide invaluable support in these efforts
through the actions of a firm’s creditors protecting against losses. In
protecting themselves, creditors can exert direct discipline on firms as
well as provide information that regulators can use to inform their over-
sight functions. In order for these investors to play this role, they must
expect to bear losses if the firm fails. This article sets out a framework
for creating credible losers at GSIBs and other SIFIs. It identifies three
key criteria for establishing credible losers who can support prudential
aims: that the claims be (1) sensitive primarily to the downside risk of
default and that they be neither (2) systemically important themselves
nor (3) entangled with systemically important claims. Claims that meet
these criteria will support regulatory goals in ways that are difficult to
duplicate through other means. I use this framework to analyze the
recent proposed rule that will require GSIBs to issue LTD, and suggest
that the rule is largely successful in meeting the three criteria for estab-
lishing credible losers. The rule’s primary justification is the establish-
ment of loss absorbers who can serve as a buffer between SIFI failure
and taxpayer support, but the potential for credible losers to exert mar-
ket discipline on SIFIs constitutes an independent reason to support the
rule. The article also identifies gaps left by the rule—first and foremost
its applicability only to U.S. GSIBs. It suggests that the three criteria
might be met for non-GSIB SIFIs in one of two ways: by CoCo bonds,
which can absorb losses prior to, rather than as a part of, insolvency
and resolution; and by side bets, which can create credible losers among
third parties without a direct claim on the firm, but whose prices can
provide valuable signals to regulators. In any event, establishing and
honing a wider range of credible losers whose fates are tied to SIFIs
should be a priority of prudential regulatory reform.
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